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Abstract 
Although “too big to fail” (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the near-collapse 
of several large financial firms in 2008. Large financial firms that failed or required extraordinary 
government assistance in the recent crisis included depositories (Citigroup and Washington Mutual), 
government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), insurance companies (AIG), and 
investment banks (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).1 In many of these cases, policy makers justified 
the use of government resources on the grounds that the firms were “systemically important” or “too big 
to fail.” TBTF is the concept that a firm’s disorderly failure would cause widespread disruptions in financial 
markets that could not easily be contained. While the government had no explicit policy to rescue TBTF 
firms, several were rescued on those grounds once the crisis struck. TBTF subsequently became one of 
the systemic risk issues that policy makers grappled with in the wake of the recent crisis. 
This report discusses the economic issues raised by TBTF, broad policy options, and policy changes 
made by the relevant Dodd-Frank provisions. This report also discusses recent legislation addressing the 
TBTF issue in the 113th Congress. The report ends with an Appendix reviewing the historical experience 
with TBTF before and during the recent crisis. 
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Summary 
Although “too big to fail” (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the 
near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Financial firms are said to be TBTF when 
policy makers judge that their failure would cause unacceptable disruptions to the overall 
financial system, and they can be TBTF because of their size or interconnectedness. In addition to 
fairness issues, economic theory suggests that expectations that a firm will not be allowed to fail 
create moral hazard—if the creditors and counterparties of a TBTF firm believe that the 
government will protect them from losses, they have less incentive to monitor the firm’s riskiness 
because they are shielded from the negative consequences of those risks. If so, they could have a 
funding advantage compared with other banks, which some call an implicit subsidy. S.Con.Res. 
8, passed by the Senate on March 22, 2013, and H.Con.Res. 25, as amended and passed by the 
Senate on October 16, 2013, create a non-binding budget reserve fund that allows for future 
legislation to address the TBTF funding advantage. 
There are a number of policy approaches—some complementary, some conflicting—to coping 
with the TBTF problem, including providing government assistance to prevent TBTF firms from 
failing or systemic risk from spreading; enforcing “market discipline” to ensure that investors, 
creditors, and counterparties curb excessive risk-taking at TBTF firms; enhancing regulation to 
hold TBTF firms to stricter prudential standards than other financial firms; curbing firms’ size 
and scope, by preventing mergers or compelling firms to divest assets, for example; minimizing 
spillover effects by limiting counterparty exposure; and instituting a special resolution regime for 
failing systemically important firms. A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than 
one approach, as some approaches are aimed at preventing failures and some at containing fallout 
when a failure occurs.  
Parts of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) 
address all of these policy approaches. For example, it created an enhanced prudential regulatory 
regime administered by the Federal Reserve for non-bank financial firms designated as 
“systemically important” by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and banks with 
more than $50 billion in assets. About 30 U.S. bank holding companies and a larger number of 
foreign banks have more than $50 billion in assets, and the FSOC has designated two insurers 
(AIG and Prudential) and GE Capital as systemically important. According to the insurer 
MetLife, FSOC has proposed to designate it as well. In addition, eight banks headquartered in the 
United States will be assessed capital surcharges under Basel III. H.R. 4881, ordered to be 
reported by the House Financial Services Committee on June 20, 2014, would place a one-year 
moratorium on FSOC designations. H.R. 5016, which passed the House on July 16, 2014, would 
not allow any funds to be used to designate a non-bank as systemically important or as posing a 
systemic threat to financial stability. S. 2270, as passed by the Senate, and H.R. 5461, as passed 
by the House, would allow regulators to exempt insurers from bank capital requirements (the 
“Collins Amendment” to the Dodd-Frank Act). 
The Dodd-Frank Act also created a special resolution regime administered by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation to take into receivership failing firms that pose a threat to financial 
stability. This regime has not been used to date, and has some similarities to how the FDIC 
resolves failing banks. Statutory authority used to prevent financial firms from failing during the 
crisis has either expired or been narrowed by the Dodd-Frank Act.  
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Introduction 
Although “too big to fail” (TBTF) has been a perennial policy issue, it was highlighted by the 
near-collapse of several large financial firms in 2008. Large financial firms that failed or required 
extraordinary government assistance in the recent crisis included depositories (Citigroup and 
Washington Mutual), government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), 
insurance companies (AIG), and investment banks (Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers).1 In many 
of these cases, policy makers justified the use of government resources on the grounds that the 
firms were “systemically important” or “too big to fail.” TBTF is the concept that a firm’s 
disorderly failure would cause widespread disruptions in financial markets that could not easily 
be contained. While the government had no explicit policy to rescue TBTF firms, several were 
rescued on those grounds once the crisis struck. TBTF subsequently became one of the systemic 
risk issues that policy makers grappled with in the wake of the recent crisis.  
Systemic risk mitigation, including eliminating the TBTF problem, was a major goal of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), comprehensive financial 
regulatory reform enacted in 2010.2 Different parts of this legislation jointly address the “too big 
to fail” problem through requirements for enhanced regulation for safety and soundness for 
“systemically important” (also called “systemically significant”) financial institutions (SIFIs), 
limits on size and the types of activities a firm can engage in (including proprietary trading and 
hedge fund sponsorship), and the creation of a new receivership regime for resolving failing non-
banks that pose systemic risk.  
About 30 U.S. bank holding companies and a larger number of foreign banks will automatically 
be subject to enhanced regulation because they have at least $50 billion in assets. In addition, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a council of U.S. regulators headed by the 
Treasury Secretary,3 has designated two insurers (AIG and Prudential) and one other non-bank 
(GE Capital) as “systemically important,” and therefore subject to heightened prudential 
regulation.4 According to the insurer MetLife, FSOC has proposed to designate it as well.5 H.R. 
4881, ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee on June 20, 2014, would 
place a one-year moratorium on FSOC designations of non-banks as systemically important upon 
enactment. The Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act of 2014 (H.R. 
5016), which passed the House on July 16, 2014, would not allow any funds to be used to 
designate a non-bank as systemically important or as posing a systemic threat to financial 
                                                 
1 For more information, see CRS Report R41073, Government Interventions in Response to Financial Turmoil, by 
Baird Webel and Marc Labonte. 
2 For an overview, see CRS Report R41350, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: 
Background and Summary, coordinated by Baird Webel. For more information on systemic risk provisions, see CRS 
Report R41384, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Systemic Risk and the Federal 
Reserve, by Marc Labonte. 
3 For more information on the FSOC, see CRS Report R42083, Financial Stability Oversight Council: A Framework to 
Mitigate Systemic Risk, by Edward V. Murphy. 
4 Information on designated firms can be accessed here: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/
default.aspx. 
5 MetLife, press release, September 4, 2014, https://www.metlife.com/about/press-room/index.html?compID=140852. 
See also U.S. Treasury, press release, September 4, 2014, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2621.aspx. 
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stability. S. 2270, which passed the Senate on June 5, 2014, would allow the regulators to exempt 
insurers from the “Collins Amendment” to the Dodd-Frank Act—bank capital requirements that 
would otherwise apply because the insurers are bank holding companies or have been designated 
as systemically important. Title I of H.R. 5461, which passed the House on September 16, 2014, 
contains the same language as S. 2270. 
In addition, the Financial Stability Board, an international forum, has identified 29 banks, 8 of 
which are headquartered in the United States, as “globally systemically important banks” (G-
SIBs) and 9 insurers as “globally systemically important insurers,” 3 of which are headquartered 
in the United States.6 Under the Basel III Accord, banks identified by the Financial Stability 
Board as systemically important are subject to higher capital standards, including a higher 
supplementary leverage ratio. 
Ultimately, the failure of a large firm is the only test of whether the TBTF problem still exists. In 
the meantime, studies have found mixed evidence as to whether large financial firms can still 
borrow at advantageous rates compared with other firms because investors—rightly or wrongly—
perceive that they enjoy TBTF status.7 S.Con.Res. 8, passed by the Senate on March 22, 2013, 
and H.Con.Res. 25, as amended and passed by the Senate on October 16, 2013, create a non-
binding budget reserve fund that allows for future legislation to address the TBTF funding 
advantage. Some critics argue that this legislation does not go far enough to solve the TBTF 
problem, and others argue it will have the perverse effect of exacerbating the TBTF problem. 
There has not yet been legislation enacted to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which remain 
in government receivership. 
This report discusses the economic issues raised by TBTF, broad policy options, and policy 
changes made by the relevant Dodd-Frank provisions. This report also discusses recent legislation 
addressing the TBTF issue in the 113th Congress. The report ends with an Appendix reviewing 
the historical experience with TBTF before and during the recent crisis. 
Economic Issues 
Context 
Evidence on the size of financial firms can be viewed in absolute and relative terms—relative to 
other industries and within the industry (i.e., concentration). In the first quarter of 2014, there 
were 39 U.S. banks with more than $50 billion in assets, of which 4 had more than $1.5 trillion in 
assets. Ten years earlier, there was only one U.S. bank with more than $1 trillion in assets.8 
                                                 
6 Financial Stability Board, “2013 Update of Global Systemically Important Banks,” November 11, 2013, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131111.pdf; Financial Stability Board, “Global Systemically 
Important Insurers and the Policy Measures That Will Apply to Them,” July 18, 2013, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130718.pdf. The Financial Stability Board is an international 
forum of which the United States is a member. A list of the U.S. firms can be found in the section below entitled 
“Regulating TBTF.” 
7 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Large Bank Holding Companies – Expectations of Government 
Support, GAO-14-621, July 2014. 
8 Data from National Information Center, http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/Top50Form.aspx. This list includes 
any type of institution that includes a depository subsidiary. These data exaggerate changes in the relative importance 
(continued...) 
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In recent decades, the U.S. banking industry has become more concentrated, meaning that a 
greater percentage of total industry assets is held by large banks. Assets of the five largest bank 
holding companies (BHCs) totaled 52% of total BHC assets at the end of 2013.9 According to one 
study, the three largest banks held 5% to 15% of total commercial banking depository assets from 
the 1930s until the 1990s. The share of the top three then rose until it had reached about 40% by 
2008.10 By international standards, U.S. banks are not that large, however. Relative to GDP, the 
combined assets of the top three U.S. banks were the lowest of any major OECD economy in 
2009.11 
The four largest BHCs each held a majority of their assets in commercial bank subsidiaries. Not 
all very large financial institutions are commercial banks, however. Companies with more than 
$100 billion in assets include insurers, broker-dealers, investment funds, specialized lenders, and 
government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are among the largest firms 
overall by assets). Over the long run, large non-banks have emerged, in part because of the 
growth in “shadow banking.”12 Shadow banking refers to bank-like activities, such as lending, in 
the non-bank financial sector.13 According to one estimate, assets of broker-dealers grew from 3% 
of commercial bank assets in 1980 to nearly 30% in 2007. Over the same period, hedge fund 
capital increased from less than 1% of bank capital to more than 100%.14 While non-banks have 
been engaging in more bank-like activities, banks have also moved into non-banking businesses. 
Today, a bank can incorporate as a financial holding company that has depository subsidiaries, 
insurance subsidiaries, and broker-dealer subsidiaries, for example. 
A few large firms make up a large fraction of revenues in each major segment of the financial 
industry. Table 1 shows the 4 largest and 20 largest firms’ respective shares of total industry 
revenue for the major industry NAICS (North American Industrial Classification System) 
classifications. According to the latest available Census data, securities firms are the most 
concentrated when measured by revenue, and the industry grew more concentrated between 1997 
and 2007, whether measured by the top 4 or top 20 firms. Credit intermediation, which includes 
banking, grew significantly more concentrated between 1997 and 2002, but became slightly less 
concentrated between 2002 and 2007. Insurance firms became slightly more concentrated 
between 1997 and 2007.  
                                                                 
(...continued) 
of large banks since they do not take into account inflation or growth in the economy. 
9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Top Banks and Holding Companies, period ending December 31, 2012, available 
at http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/top_banks_bhcs.cfm. In addition, the top 
five savings and loan holding companies hold 68% of total assets and the top five state-member banks hold 47% of 
total assets; banks in those categories are considerably smaller in absolute terms than bank holding companies, 
however. 
10 Andrew Haldane and Robert May, “Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems,” Nature, vol. 469, January 2011, p. 351. 
11 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Bank Competition and Financial Stability, 2011, Figure 
1.1. 
12 Many of these large institutions that focus on non-banking activities are chartered as bank holding companies or 
savings and loan holding companies. 
13 For more information, see CRS Report R43345, Shadow Banking: Background and Policy Issues, by Edward V. 
Murphy and Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, and Zoltan Pozsar, “Shadow Banking,” Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, working paper, December 31, 2009. 
14 Tobias Adrian, Christopher Burke, and James McAndrews, The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 15, no. 4, New York, NY, August 
2009. 
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Table 1. Large Financial Firms’ Share of Total Industry Revenue, 1997-2007 
(percentage) 
 Top 4 Firms Top 20 Firms 
 1997 2002 2007 1997 2002 2007 
Credit Intermediation  
(NAICS 522) 
12.6 21.5 20.6 33.4 46.4 45.0 
Securities (NAICS 523) 19.3 23.6 24.6 47.7 50.0 51.8 
Insurance (NAICS 524) 13.7 12.6 14.6 37.9 36.9 40.6 
Funds and Trusts  
(NAICS 525) 
19.0 24.4 n/a 48.9 57.0 n/a 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Census, various years. 
Notes: Data are reported by NAICS code. 
It remains to be seen how concentration, as measured by the Census, was affected by the financial 
crisis. The financial crisis reduced the number of large financial firms, but also led to an increase 
in the size of the remaining large firms, through a series of mergers and acquisitions.15 
Compared with other industries, financial firms are large in dollar terms when measured by assets 
and liabilities but not by measures such as revenue because of the nature of financial 
intermediation. For example, there are only two firms (Berkshire Hathaway and General Electric) 
with revenues from financial businesses—and both have substantial non-financial revenues—and 
no bank holding companies among the 10 largest Fortune 500 firms in 2013 when measured by 
revenue, but financial companies are the only Fortune 500 firms with more than $1 trillion in 
assets.16 Financial firms are also not as concentrated as some other industries.17 In layman’s 
terms, there is no “Pepsi/Coke” dominance in the financial sector. These comparisons may help to 
illustrate why traditional policy tools such as antitrust have not been used against large financial 
firms recently and suggest that the TBTF phenomenon in finance lies in the nature of financial 
intermediation, which is the topic of the next section. 
Economic Effects of Too Big to Fail 
Contagion can be transmitted from small or large financial institutions (see the following text 
box), but large firms pose unique problems. Firms are likely to have more counterparty exposure 
to large firms, and the losses or disruptions caused by counterparty exposure when a large firm 
fails could be severe enough to lead to failure of third parties. Problems at large firms could also 
lead to “fire sales” in specific securities markets that depress market prices, thereby imposing 
                                                 
15 According to one estimate, mergers and acquisitions during the crisis increased the assets of the four largest banks 
from 30% to 44% of total bank assets. Richard Fisher, “Two Areas of Present Concern,” speech before the Senior 
Delegates’ Roundtable of the Fixed Income Forum, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 23, 2009. 
16 Data can be accessed at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/. The lack of financial firms in the top 
10 by revenue does not appear to be driven by the effects of the financial crisis. For example, there were two 
predominantly financial firms in the top 10 by revenue in 2006. 
17 One study of the ten most concentrated industries did not include any financial firms. See Andrea Alegria et al, 
“Highly Concentrated: Companies that Dominate Their Industries,” IBISWorld, February 2012, 
http://www.ibisworld.com/Common/MediaCenter/Highly%20Concentrated%20Industries.pdf. 
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losses on other holders of similar securities.18 Some economists argue that the real problem is 
some firms are “too interconnected to fail.” That is, it is not the sheer size of certain firms that 
causes contagion, but the fact that most activity in certain key market segments flows through 
those firms.19 According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a few large firms “dominate 
key market segments ranging from private securitization and derivatives dealing to triparty repo 
and leveraged investor financing.”20 Were the interconnected firm to fail, other firms would have 
difficulty absorbing the failed firm’s business, and there would be disruptions to the flow of 
credit. If problems in one market segment undermine an interconnected firm, problems can 
spread to the other market segments in which the firm operates.  
 
Why Are Financial Firms Vulnerable to Instability? 
Economists consider financial firms to be uniquely vulnerable to instability because a fundamental feature of financial 
intermediation is the use of short-term liabilities (debt or deposits) to finance long-term assets (e.g., loans). As a 
result, assets cannot be liquidated fast enough or at a sufficient price to fund redemptions in a panic. The use of 
liabilities, rather than equity, to finance most assets (referred to as “leverage”) can result in losses exceeding equity, 
which results in insolvency, or an inability to meet obligations to all creditors in full. These features make financial 
intermediaries inherently vulnerable to runs—since those who redeem funds first are thought more likely to access 
their funds, there is an incentive for creditors to rush to redeem, whether the firm is suffering from a liquidity 
problem or a solvency problem. Panics can be self-fulfilling: whether or not the institution originally had financial 
problems, a panic can lead to its failure. Panics are also prone to contagion—the observation of a run at one 
institution can lead creditors to run on other institutions, because of perceived connections or similarities to the 
original firm. 
The classic run involves depositors at banks, but the recent crisis demonstrated that other debt markets can also be 
susceptible to runs for banks and non-bank financial firms. Non-bank financial firms were highly reliant on short-term 
borrowing, through financial instruments such as repurchase agreements and commercial paper. They favor short-
term borrowing because in normal conditions these short-term funds are inexpensive and readily available. The short 
maturity of these instruments meant that loans needed to be rolled over frequently. The proximate cause of most of 
these firms’ failure was the inability to roll over maturing debt. When these firms experienced financial difficulties, 
counterparties became reluctant (or were not in a position) to transact and maintain business relationships with 
them. For example, major investment banks are “market-makers” (ready buyers and sellers) for securities markets; 
provide prime brokerage services for hedge funds; are major participants in over-the-counter markets for securities 
such as derivatives; play important roles in payment, clearing, and settlement activities; and so on. If counterparties in 
any of these areas are no longer willing to transact with the firm because of fears of a run, the firm’s financial 
difficulties can quickly compound. 
Although some policy makers have dismissed the claim that any firm could be too big to fail, 
many analysts believe the failure of Lehman Brothers, occurring in the context of difficulties at 
several large financial firms, was the proximate cause of the worsening of the crisis in September 
2008.21 One can debate whether policy actions in the months leading up to Lehman Brothers’ 
                                                 
18 An alternative perspective is that the simultaneous failure or emergency experienced by many firms during the crisis 
was primarily caused by a lack of diversified risk that led to many firms experiencing losses on similar investments (in 
this case, mortgage-related investments), as opposed to losses being caused by counterparty exposure. This perspective 
does not necessarily require a TBTF problem to explain the crisis. For example, see Daniel Tarullo, “Regulating 
Systemic Risk,” speech at 2011 Credit Markets Symposium, Charlotte, North Carolina, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20110331a.htm. 
19 Hereafter, for convenience, this report will use the terms “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to fail” 
interchangeably. 
20 International Monetary Fund, United States—Selected Issues, July 13, 2009, p. 24. 
21 See, for example, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report, Ch. 18, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. For an alternative perspective on the importance of Lehman 
Brothers, see “Dissenting Views” in the same report. 
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failure made its failure more or less disruptive, but it is fair to say that it is unlikely that the panic 
that followed could have been avoided since the nature of the disruptions its failure caused 
(notably, its effect on money markets) was not widely foreseen.22 “Bailing out” TBTF firms may 
not be an intended policy objective, but may become the second-best crisis containment measure 
when the failure of a TBTF firm is imminent to prevent fallout to the broader financial system 
and the economy as a whole. 
While many people object to rescuing TBTF firms on moral or philosophical grounds, there are 
also economic reasons why having firms that are TBTF is inefficient. In general, for market 
forces to lead to an efficient allocation of resources, finding a good use of resources must be 
financially rewarded and a bad use must be financially punished. Firms generally run into 
financial problems when they have persistently allocated capital to inefficient uses. To save such 
a firm would be expected to retard efforts to shift that capital to more efficient uses, and may 
allow the firm to continue making more bad decisions in the future. The TBTF problem results in 
too much financial intermediation taking place at large firms and too little at other firms from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, although not necessarily from the perspective of non-
economic policy rationales.23 Because large and small financial firms do not serve exactly the 
same customers or operate in exactly the same lines of business, too much capital will flow to the 
customers and in the lines of business of large firms and too little to those of small firms in the 
presence of TBTF. 
Preventing TBTF firms from failing is argued to be necessary for maintaining the stability of the 
financial system in the short run. But rescuing TBTF firms is predicted to lead to a less stable 
financial system in the long run because of moral hazard that weakens market discipline. Moral 
hazard refers to the theory that if TBTF firms expect that failure will be prevented, they have an 
incentive to take greater risks than they otherwise would because they are shielded from at least 
some negative consequences of those risks.24 In general, riskier investments have a higher rate of 
return to compensate for the greater risk of failure. If TBTF firms believe that they will not be 
allowed to fail, then private firms capture any additional profits that result from high-risk 
activities, while the government bears any extreme losses. Thus, if TBTF firms believe that they 
will be rescued, they have an incentive to behave in a way that makes it more likely they will fail.  
To see how the moral hazard problem is transmitted, it is helpful to examine who gets directly 
“rescued” when the government intervenes to prevent the fallout to the overall financial system 
and broader economy. The direct beneficiaries of a rescue will include some combination of the 
firm’s management, owners (e.g., shareholders), creditors (including depositors), account holders, 
                                                 
22 For more information on the events of 2008, see the Appendix. 
23 In the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, this was arguably the policy goal—Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
low-borrowing costs were seen by some as desirable insofar as it led to lower borrowing costs for homeowners. A key 
feature of the housing bubble was overinvestment in housing, spurred by the over-availability of mortgage credit. 
24 Evidence that larger banks are consistently riskier than smaller banks is mixed. For example, one measure of 
riskiness is leverage (the proportion of liabilities to equity held by a bank). One study found that large U.S. commercial 
banks were less leveraged than small banks on average during the past decade, but the median large bank was modestly 
more leveraged than the median small bank. Large banks also had more off-balance-sheet activities, which some 
believe made banks appear to be less risky than they turned out to be. The study also found that investment banks were 
much more leveraged than commercial banks, and large investment banks were more leveraged than small ones. 
Source: Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sorensen, Sevcan Yesiltas, “Leverage Across Firms, Banks, and Countries,” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper no. 17354, August 2011. Anecdotal evidence points to a 
number of large banks whose risky behavior resulted in failure or rescue during the crisis, but most failing banks over 
the past few years were small banks. 
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and counterparties. Under bankruptcy, these groups would bear losses to differing degrees 
depending on the legal priority of their claims. Government assistance, depending on its terms, 
can protect some or all of these groups from losses. In some recent government rescues, 
management has been replaced; in others, it has not. Even if management believes that losses will 
lead to removal, managers may prefer excessive risk taking (with higher expected profits) 
because they are not personally liable for the firms’ losses.25 In some cases, shareholders have 
borne some losses through stock dilution, although their losses may have been smaller than they 
would have been in a bankruptcy. Creditors, account holders, and counterparties have generally 
been shielded from any losses. Thus, government rescues have not mitigated the moral hazard 
problem for creditors and counterparties. Because the government will only intervene in the case 
of extreme losses, moral hazard may manifest itself primarily in areas affected only by systemic 
events (referred to as “tail risk”). For example, extreme losses from counterparty risk may be 
ignored by counterparties to TBTF firms if they believe that government will always intervene to 
prevent failure; if so, costs (such as the amount of margin a counterparty will require) will be 
lower for TBTF firms than competitors in these markets. 
Do TBTF Firms Enjoy a Funding Advantage or Implicit Subsidy? 
Economic theory predicts that in the presence of moral hazard, creditors and counterparties of 
TBTF firms provide credit at an inefficiently low cost. Some studies have provided evidence that 
the funding advantage exists, although many of these studies cover time periods that end before 
the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act.26 Identifying a lower funding cost for large banks alone is 
not enough to prove a moral hazard effect because lower cost could also be due to other factors, 
such as greater liquidity or lower risk (e.g., greater diversity).27 A GAO review of the empirical 
literature found that a funding advantage for large firms during the financial crisis had declined 
by 2011. Its own econometric analysis found evidence of a funding advantage during the crisis, 
but mixed evidence on the existence of a funding advantage in 2012 and 2013—indeed, more 
versions of their model found higher funding costs for large banks rather than the expected lower 
costs, holding other factors equal.28  
Some view the decision by certain credit rating agencies to rate the largest financial firms more 
highly because they assume the firms would receive government support as evidence of the 
funding advantage, although two of the three major rating agencies have reduced the magnitude 
of this “ratings uplift” in recent years.29 (It should be noted that credit ratings do not directly 
determine funding costs.)  
                                                 
25 Economists refer to this as a “principal-agent” problem. 
26 Studies using empirical evidence to estimate the TBTF funding advantage are reviewed in Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, “Governmental Rescues of ‘Too Big To Fail’ Financial Institutions,” Preliminary Staff Report, August 
2010, ch. 3, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-Governmental-Rescues.pdf; Randall 
Kroszner, “A Review of Bank Funding Cost Differentials,” University of Chicago, working paper, November 2013, 
https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/con_044532.pdf; Thomas Hoenig, Testimony before the 
Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, June 26, 2013, Attachment 3, 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba00-wstate-thoenig-20130626.pdf.  
27 See Goldman Sachs, “Measuring the TBTF Effect on Bond Pricing,” Global Markets Institute, May 2013. 
28 Government Accountability Office, Large Bank Holding Companies – Expectations of Government Support, GAO-
14-621, July 2014, p. 40-55. 
29 Government Accountability Office, Large Bank Holding Companies – Expectations of Government Support, GAO-
14-621, July 2014, p. 24 and Financial Stability Oversight Council, Annual Report, 2014, p. 117. 
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This funding advantage is sometimes referred to as the TBTF subsidy, although a subsidy 
typically implies a government willingness to provide the recipient with a benefit. Note also that a 
subsidy typically takes the form of an explicit direct payment, financial support, or guarantee, 
whereas in this case, if the funding advantage exists, it would derive from the expectation of 
future support that has not been pledged. 
Policy Options 
Policy Before and During the Crisis 
TBTF policy before the crisis could be described as purposeful ambiguity—policy was not 
explicit about what would happen in the event that large financial firms become insolvent, or 
which firms were considered TBTF.30 (Certain statutory benefits conferred to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac came closer to an explicit TBTF status, and markets treated them as such.) 
Conventional wisdom before the crisis was that this ambiguity would help contain the moral 
hazard problem—if investors and creditors did not know if a firm was TBTF, they would err on 
the side of caution and treat it as if it were not TBTF.31 Problems with large firms in the recent 
crisis suggest that this approach was not effective.  
Theoretically, moral hazard can be mitigated through prudential regulation for safety and 
soundness. Generally, the regulatory regime before the crisis was not based on firm size, but 
rather on charter type. Depository institutions were regulated for safety and soundness to 
minimize the costs of, and the moral hazard that results from, deposit insurance and access to the 
Fed’s discount window. Because some non-bank financial firms did not receive analogous 
government protection before the crisis, there was not seen to be a moral hazard problem that 
justified regulating them for safety and soundness. Pre-crisis safety and soundness regulation did 
not explicitly address the additional moral hazard that results from TBTF, in part because TBTF 
firms were not explicitly identified.  
Before the crisis, large financial firms were subject to Federal Reserve prudential oversight at the 
holding company level if they were organized as bank holding companies or financial holding 
companies.32 Prudential regulation entailed supervision and examination for safety and 
soundness. In 1997, the Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) set up an 
internal team to supervise large complex banking organizations.33 Regulation at the holding 
                                                 
30 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “Governmental Rescues of ‘Too Big To Fail’ Financial Institutions,” 
Preliminary Staff Report, August 2010, ch. 3, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-
Governmental-Rescues.pdf. 
31 An alternative perspective is that there was no explicit TBTF policy because changes in market structure over time—
namely, the emergence of large, complex banks and non-bank financial firms—did not trigger legislative changes to 
create a TBTF policy. 
32 Thrifts, credit unions, and banks that did not have holding company structures were not subject to prudential 
oversight by the Fed. In this sense, some large banks were regulated differently than some small banks before the crisis, 
although not all bank holding companies were large and not all thrifts were small. 
33 Since there was no explicit TBTF policy, it is speculative as to whether the Fed considered all of the banks it 
identified as large complex banking institutions to be TBTF. Prior to the crisis, there was not authority to set higher 
quantitative prudential standards for TBTF banks, although regulators do enjoy discretion in their supervision. See 
Federal Reserve, Framework for Risk-Focused Supervision of Large Complex Institutions, Handbook, August 1997, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1997/sr9724a1.pdf. 
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company level did not mean that all subsidiaries were regulated for safety and soundness by the 
Fed. Bank holding companies (BHCs) could operate non-banking subsidiaries, but banking 
regulators could only regulate banking subsidiaries for safety and soundness. “Firewalls” were 
meant to protect the depository subsidiary from losses at other types of subsidiaries. The holding 
company had to demonstrate that it was a source of strength for the depository subsidiary.34 
Government-sponsored enterprises, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home 
Loan Banks, were also subject to prudential regulation by their own regulators. Prudential 
regulation did not prevent all large banks or the GSEs from experiencing financial difficulties 
during the crisis. 
Some of the large firms that experienced financial difficulties in the recent crisis, however, were 
not bank holding companies, under Fed regulation, at that time. Types of large firms that were not 
BHCs included some government sponsored enterprises, insurance companies, investment banks 
(or broker-dealers), and hedge funds. Insurance subsidiaries were regulated for safety and 
soundness at the state level. Investment banks complied with an SEC net capital rule. Some large 
financial firms, including AIG and Lehman Brothers, were thrift holding companies supervised 
by the Office of Thrift Supervision before the crisis. The Office of Thrift Supervision was mainly 
concerned with the health of AIG’s and Lehman Brothers’ thrift subsidiaries, although those were 
a minor part of their businesses.  
Some large financial firms voluntarily became BHCs during the crisis. Specifically, the five 
largest investment banks either merged with BHCs (Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch), became BHCs 
(Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley), or declared bankruptcy (Lehman Brothers) in 2008.  
If a bank is heading toward insolvency, the FDIC normally takes it into receivership and resolves 
it. Statutory requirements of least cost resolution of failing depositories by the FDIC may also 
help to minimize moral hazard, because bailing out firms (i.e., making creditors whole) is often 
more costly than shutting a firm down. But least cost resolution could be waived by the Treasury 
Secretary, upon the recommendation of the FDIC and Federal Reserve, if a systemic risk 
exception were invoked.35 Market participants may have expected that the systemic risk exception 
would be invoked for large firms. The presumption before the crisis was that a failed non-bank 
would be subject to the standard corporate bankruptcy process; there was no standing policy of 
government involvement in the failure of a non-bank, with the exception of conservatorship 
authority for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.36  
The Federal Reserve was authorized to provide liquidity to banks through collateralized loans at 
the discount window, with limitations for banks that are not well capitalized. In previous episodes 
of financial turmoil such as 1987 and 1998, the Fed’s decision to flood markets with liquidity had 
proven sufficient to restore confidence.37 There was no standing policy to provide liquidity to 
non-bank financial firms to guard against runs before the recent crisis. Such a policy did not 
                                                 
34 For more information, see Mark Greenlee, “Historical Review of ‘Umbrella Regulation’ by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, working paper 08-07, October 2008. 
35 For more information, see “Selected Historical Experiences With “Too Big To Fail” 
36 For more information on the GSEs, see CRS Report RL34657, Financial Institution Insolvency: Federal Authority 
over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Depository Institutions. 
37 As discussed above, due to the nature of financial intermediation, financial firms can never hold enough liquidity to 
survive a run. Nevertheless, critics have argued that the Fed’s response to turmoil enabled firms to take on excessive 
liquidity risk. This policy is sometimes referred to as the “Greenspan put,” referring to the fact that the Fed’s 
willingness to provide liquidity in times of trouble provided firms with a hedge against liquidity risk. 
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prove necessary to maintain stability before the recent crisis, perhaps because there was less 
historical experience with non-bank runs, and perhaps because non-bank financial firms have 
become a more important part of the financial system over time. The Fed had broad existing 
emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to lend to non-banks, but 
prior to the crisis had not done so since the 1930s. 
Policy during the recent crisis could be described as reactive, developing ad hoc in fits and starts 
in reaction to events. Ultimately, banks received federal assistance, and a lack of an explicit safety 
net and federal prudential regulation did not prevent some non-banks from receiving federal 
assistance as well. In the absence of explicit authority to rescue a TBTF firm, as the crisis 
unfolded, the broad standing authority was used: Section 13(3) was used to prevent the failures of 
Bear Stearns and AIG. Section 13(3) and the FDIC’s systemic risk authority38 was used to offer 
asset guarantees to Bank of America and Citigroup. These authorities were also used to create 
broadly based emergency programs. Other programs were created after the crisis began under 
authority granted by Congress in 2008. Assistance was given under the Housing and Economic 
Recovery Act (HERA; P.L. 110-289) to prevent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from becoming 
insolvent. In October 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA; 
P.L. 110-343), creating the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which was used, among other 
things, to inject capital into several large financial firms.39 The Fed and FDIC authorities are 
permanent; as discussed below, both authorities were modified by the Dodd-Frank Act. The 
HERA and EESA authority expired in 2010, although funds continued to be available after 
expiration under several outstanding contracts. 
Policy Options and the Policy Response After the Crisis 
Policy options for TBTF can be categorized as preventive (how to prevent TBTF firms from 
either emerging or posing systemic risk) or reactive (how to contain the fallout when a TBTF firm 
experiences a crisis). A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than one approach 
because different approaches are aimed at different parts of the problem. A policy approach that 
would not solve the TBTF problem in isolation could be successful in conjunction with others. 
Some policy approaches are complementary—others could counteract each other. 
Although there are costs to having large financial firms because of the moral hazard problems, 
these costs must be weighed against potential benefits to determine the economically optimal 
policy response. These benefits are discussed in the section below entitled “Limiting the Size of 
Financial Firms.” 
When considering each policy option discussed in this section, an alternative perspective to 
consider is that problems at large firms during the crisis—such as overleveraging, a sudden loss 
of liquidity, concentrated or undiversified losses, investor uncertainty caused by opacity—were 
not TBTF problems per se. If, in fact, they were representative of problems that firms of all sizes 
were experiencing, policy should directly treat these problems in a systematic and uniform way 
for all firms, and not just for TBTF firms, in this view. In other words, prudential regulation, a 
                                                 
38 12 USC 1823(c). In total, GAO reports that the FDIC’s systemic risk exception was invoked five times during the 
crisis. See Government Accountability Office, Federal Deposit Insurance Act:Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk 
Exception, GAO-10-100, April 2010. 
39 Information on government assistance provided during the crisis can be found in CRS Report R41073, Government 
Interventions in Response to Financial Turmoil, by Baird Webel and Marc Labonte. 
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special resolution regime, and policies limiting spillover effects could be applied to all firms 
operating in a given area rather than just large firms, so arguments for and against these policy 
options do not apply only to their application to large firms. If the causes of systemic risk are not 
tied to firm size or interconnectedness, then policies based on differential treatment of TBTF 
firms could result in systemic risk migrating to non-TBTF firms rather than being eliminated. 
End or Continue “Bailouts”? 
Options 
“Bailouts” are defined differently by different people. For the purposes of this report, they are 
defined as government assistance to a single firm to prevent it from failing (i.e., allow it to meet 
all ongoing obligations in full), in contrast to widely available emergency government programs 
to provide liquidity to solvent firms. TBTF bailouts could be delivered through assistance unique 
to the firm or through existing government programs on a preferential, subsidized basis.40 They 
could come in the form of federal loans, insurance, guarantees, capital injections, or other firm-
specific commitments. 
Three broad policy approaches to government “bailouts” of failing TBTF firms are available: (1) 
institutionalize the availability of assistance in standing programs with standards and procedures 
for access enumerated beforehand; (2) offer assistance on an ad hoc basis using broad, 
discretionary authority, adding authority as necessary; or (3) eliminate any source of broad 
authority that could potentially make assistance available (often referred to as a “market 
discipline” policy).  
The policy approach pursued before and during the crisis was essentially the second, as discussed 
in the previous section. The crisis left many policy makers and observers criticizing this approach 
as arbitrary, unfair, lacking in transparency, and too costly (although, in most cases, funds were 
eventually repaid in full).41 Many economists would also credit it with eventually restoring 
financial stability, however, by restoring healthy and unhealthy financial firms’ access to liquidity 
and capital.42 
One problem with a “bailouts” approach is that one can only learn whether a firm’s failure would 
be disruptive if it is allowed to fail. Once a firm has been rescued, there is no way of knowing 
how disruptive its failure would have been. As a result, policy makers may decide to err on the 
side of caution and rescue any firm that they believe poses risk of contagion since the short-term 
                                                 
40 A GAO evaluation found that while the largest banks received a majority of the assistance from the Fed’s broadly 
based emergency programs in dollar terms, they had the lowest ratio of assistance to total assets, whereas the smallest 
banks had the highest ratio. By contrast, the largest banks had the highest ratio of guaranteed debt to assets in the 
FDIC’s TGLP and the highest ratio of capital to assets in TARP while participating. Government Accountability 
Office, Government Support for Bank Holding Companies, GAO-14-18, November 2013, Table 4, 5, and 6. 
41 See, for example, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report, Ch. 18, http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf; Congressional Oversight Panel, An Overall Assessment of TARP and 
Financial Stability, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 4, 2011, S.Hrg.112-3. For an overview of government assistance 
during the crisis, see CRS Report R43413, Costs of Government Interventions in Response to the Financial Crisis: A 
Retrospective, by Baird Webel and Marc Labonte. 
42 An alternative perspective is that government intervention worsened the crisis by creating policy uncertainty. See, for 
example, John Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong,” 
November 2008, working paper, http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf. 
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costs of disruption to financial markets may be high. In this sense, the number of firms that are 
politically TBTF, particularly at times of market stress, may be larger than the number that are 
economically TBTF (i.e., pose systemic risk).  
Under the market discipline approach, policy makers would pledge to provide no federal 
assistance to any failing firm going forward. In theory, if creditors believed that a firm would not 
receive government support, they would not enable firms to take what they perceived to be 
excessive risks, and risky actions would be priced more efficiently.43 Unfortunately, 
accomplishing this goal is not as simple as proclaiming a “no bailouts” policy. If the moral hazard 
problem is to be avoided, market participants must be convinced that when faced with a failure 
that could potentially be highly damaging to the broader economy—and just how damaging 
cannot be fully known until after the fact—policy makers will not deviate from the stated policy 
and provide bailouts. But current policy makers cannot prevent future policy makers from 
offering assistance to a failing TBTF firm. Although it is in the long-term interest of policy 
makers to withhold assistance to prevent moral hazard, it is in the short-term interest of policy 
makers to provide assistance to prevent systemic risk. This makes it difficult to craft a “market 
discipline” policy that is credible to market participants.44 Even if policy makers did intend to 
maintain a market discipline policy, as long as creditors disbelieved such a policy would be 
maintained in the event of a crisis, the moral hazard problem would remain.  
Events in the crisis rewarded size and interconnectedness and arguably made any future “market 
discipline” policy approach less credible. As discussed in the Appendix, widespread financial 
assistance was provided in 2007-2009 to large institutions, although official policy prior to the 
crisis could have been construed as a “no bailouts” policy. Creditors may view the 2007-2009 
policy response as the most likely outcome in future systemic risk episodes. According to the 
Congressional Oversight Panel, “In light of these events, it is not surprising that markets have 
incorporated the notion that ‘too big to fail’ banks are safer than their ‘small enough to fail’ 
counterparts.”45 An alternative perspective is that market participants may view public 
dissatisfaction with the 2007-2009 policy response as making a repeat unlikely. 
Although it is impossible to prevent future policy makers from making statutory changes to 
current policy, current policy makers can make it more difficult for future policy makers to “bail 
out” firms by repealing or limiting the existing standing authority that policy makers used to 
provide assistance in the crisis. Enacting new authority is likely to be a higher hurdle than 
invoking existing authority. Examples of standing authority include the Fed’s 13(3) emergency 
authority and the FDIC’s systemic risk exception to least cost resolution. The advantage to 
maintaining broad discretionary emergency authority is that it allows policy makers to react 
quickly to unforeseen contingencies, and the authority may be used for other purposes than 
bailouts, as defined in this report. If assistance became necessary in a fast-moving crisis, new 
authority might take too long to enact. By then, the damage to the economy could be worse. In 
other words, eliminating broad authority could still result in a TBTF rescue, but after more 
financial disruption had occurred. TARP is an example of authority that was enacted relatively 
                                                 
43 As will be discussed in the section below entitled “Resolving a Large, Interconnected Failing Firm,” the failure could 
be resolved by the bankruptcy process or a special receivership regime, similar to how banks are resolved. If the latter 
is used, then issues arise as to what government support becomes available to creditors through the receiver. 
44 Economists refer to this as a “time inconsistency” problem. See Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, Too Big to Fail, 
Brookings Institute Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, ch. 2. 
45 Congressional Oversight Panel, March Oversight Report, March 16, 2011, p. 153, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=112_senate_hearings&docid=f:64832.pdf. 
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quickly during a crisis; nevertheless, its enactment took weeks, whereas contagion can spread in 
days. 
If one believes that assistance is inevitable because of short-term incentives, there are two 
advantages to institutionalizing the terms of assistance. First, making the terms and conditions 
explicit reduces the likelihood that assistance could be provided arbitrarily or on the basis of 
favoritism, and provides an opportunity to create a funding mechanism so that funding is not 
shifted to the taxpayer. Second, an explicit policy avoids policy uncertainty, which can heighten 
systemic risk. Arguably, lack of explicit policy added to the panic after Lehman Brothers failed, 
because market participants may have incorrectly based decisions on the expectation that Lehman 
Brothers would receive the same type of government assistance that Bear Stearns received.46 A 
drawback is that setting forth standards for coping with problems at large firms before the fact 
could make the moral hazard problem worse by leaving no ambiguity about which firms will 
receive assistance. 
A related approach would be to allow TBTF firms to fail, but stop contagion by creating standing 
credit facilities ahead of time to aid solvent counterparties. This would reduce moral hazard on 
the firm’s part (because its managers would have a greater incentive to avoid failure), but would 
not eliminate it because counterparties would have less reason to monitor the firm’s riskiness. An 
example of this approach is the decision to let Lehman Brothers fail, then subsequently offer a 
blanket guarantee for money market mutual funds (MMFs) to prevent a run triggered by one such 
fund’s financial difficulties related to its holdings of Lehman debt.47 As the MMF example 
illustrates, sometimes this approach could require assistance to be extended much more broadly 
than to just direct counterparties. Further, if standing facilities are too easily accessed, they could 
crowd out private inter-firm lending. 
The optimal approach to bailouts from an economic perspective is arguably the one that is least 
costly to the economy in the short and long run. The cost of TBTF to the economy includes the 
direct expenditures by the government and the costs of a less stable financial system due to moral 
hazard. It can be argued that a failure to bail out TBTF firms would make the system less stable, 
because it would potentially allow systemic risk to spread. Alternatively, if bailouts increase 
moral hazard, it can be argued that greater moral hazard causes the system to be less stable by 
encouraging TBTF firms to act less prudently. However, even without moral hazard, firms would 
sometimes fail, as finance is inherently risky. 
The 2008 experience lacks a counterfactual to definitively answer the question of which approach 
is least costly in the short run. The crisis worsened after Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail and 
ended after TARP and other broadly based emergency programs were created. Ad hoc rescues of 
failing TBTF firms had not succeeded in stabilizing financial markets to that point, but it is 
unknown whether financial conditions would have eventually normalized had that ad hoc policy 
been pursued consistently and continually. There is also no counterfactual as to what would have 
happened if there had been a consistent policy of allowing firms to fail in the crisis dating back to 
Bear Stearns, but the outcome that policy makers believed would occur if Bear Stearns had not 
been rescued is similar to events following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. 
                                                 
46 See, for example, John Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What 
Went Wrong,” November 2008, working paper, http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf. 
47 For more information, see the Appendix. 
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During the crisis, it appeared that the ultimate cost to the government of TBTF “bailouts” could 
run into the hundreds of billions, collectively.48 In hindsight, all of the special assistance to large 
financial firms (Bear Stearns, the GSEs, Ally Financial, Chrysler Financial, AIG, Citigroup, and 
Bank of America), as well as the broadly based emergency programs that large and small 
financial firms accessed, turned out to be cash-flow positive for the government (i.e., income and 
principal repayments exceeded outlays).49 Cash-flow measures, however, do not reflect the 
economic cost of assistance, which would factor in the rate of return a private investor would 
have required to make a similar investment, incorporating risk and the time value of money. On 
an economic basis, CBO has estimated that special assistance through TARP to Citigroup, Bank 
of America and broadly based programs have generated positive profits for the government, while 
the TARP assistance to AIG and the auto finance firms was subsidized.50 Although there were 
ultimately no net losses in these cases, these government interventions exposed the government to 
large potential losses.  
Estimates of the cost to the government of “bailouts” do not include the broader costs of a 
systemic disruption to the economy, which would have feedback effects on the federal budget. In 
this sense, the question of whether it is more costly to bail out TBTF firms or allow them to fail 
cannot be definitively settled. Arguably, it was the government’s interventions following Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse that ultimately ended the panic, as measured by standard measures of financial 
stress such as the spread between Treasury rates and the London Inter-bank Offering Rate 
(LIBOR), which did not begin to fall until legislation creating TARP was enacted.51  
Policy Response 
Maintaining broad discretionary authority, but attempting to limit its scope to prevent bailing out 
insolvent firms could be seen as the approach taken by Title XI of the Dodd-Frank Act. It limits 
the Fed to providing emergency assistance only through widely available facilities, requires the 
Fed to issue rules and regulations on how such assistance will be provided, and prohibits the Fed 
from lending to failing firms. It also created new statutory authority for the FDIC to set up 
emergency liquidity programs in the future with restrictions and limitations, including that the 
recipient must be solvent, rather than allowing the FDIC to again rely on an open-ended systemic 
risk exception. Critics would argue that emergency authority remains broad enough under the 
Dodd-Frank Act that regulators would be likely to use it to save TBTF firms in the future. The 
Dodd-Frank Act did not institutionalize a broadly based capital injection program similar to 
TARP’s Capital Purchase Program, which expired in 2010. 
                                                 
48 For example, CBO expected TARP alone to have a subsidy cost of $190 billion in January 2009. See Congressional 
Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook, January 2009, p. 25. 
49 CRS Report R43413, Costs of Government Interventions in Response to the Financial Crisis: A Retrospective, by 
Baird Webel and Marc Labonte. 
50 Congressional Budget Office, Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, April 2014. There is no recent estimate 
of the economic costs for programs outside of TARP. Economic gains on assistance to AIG outside of TARP partly or 
wholly offset economic costs to AIG through TARP. 
51 An alternative perspective is that government intervention worsened the crisis by creating policy uncertainty. See, for 
example, John Taylor, “The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong,” 
November 2008, working paper, http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf. 
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Limiting the Size of Financial Firms 
Options 
One approach to eliminating TBTF is to alter the characteristics of firms that make them TBTF. If 
TBTF is primarily a function of size, policy makers could require TBTF firms to sell businesses, 
divest assets, or break up to the point that they are no longer TBTF. Size can be measured in 
different ways, and regulators would likely need to use discretion to weigh a number of 
measures.52 It is also not obvious at what size a firm becomes a source of systemic risk—should 
the line be drawn at, say, $1 trillion, $100 billion, or $50 billion of assets?—and could not be 
confirmed until firms failed. A firm could be TBTF because of its overall size or because of its 
size or importance in a particular segment of the financial market, suggesting that overall size 
alone may not be a sufficient determinant of systemic importance. It is also possible that if all 
institutions were smaller because of a size cap, the largest institutions would still be systemically 
important, even though their size would not be large by today’s standards. A parallel might be the 
decision to rescue Continental Illinois in 1984—it was the seventh-largest bank, but had assets of 
only $45 billion at its peak, as geographic restrictions meant that the average size of all banks was 
smaller.53  
The benefits of reducing the size of firms are that, if successful, it could eliminate the moral 
hazard and the need for future “bailouts” stemming from TBTF. Other potential costs and benefits 
are more ambiguous. Size restrictions may raise the cost or reduce the quality of financial 
products currently provided by TBTF firms to consumers and investors; whether this is good or 
bad from an economic perspective depends on the cause. If low costs currently stem primarily 
from the TBTF “subsidy,” then economic efficiency would improve if large firms are eliminated 
even if costs rose as a result.54 Alternatively, if low costs currently stem primarily from economies 
of scale, then economic efficiency would be reduced by size restrictions.55 Beyond cost, large 
firms may make markets more liquid and enhance customer convenience (such as a nationwide 
physical presence). Large non-financial firms may also have financial needs (such as the 
underwriting of securities) that would overwhelm small financial firms.56 Similarly, if the success 
of the largest firms comes primarily through their ability to innovate and provide more 
sophisticated or superior products, then size restrictions could reduce economic efficiency.57 
                                                 
52 One variation on this approach would be to cap borrowing, so that a firm would face no size limit when financing its 
activities through capital, but in effect could not grow past a specified threshold through the use of leverage.  
53 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Continental Illinois and ‘Too Big to Fail’,” History of the Eighties, Ch. 7, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf. For more information, see the section below on Continental 
Illinois in the Appendix. 
54 See, for example, Anat R. Admati et al, “Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive,” working paper, March 23, 2011, https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/
researchpapers/library/RP2065R1&86.pdf. 
55 The evidence on the existence of economies of scale is reviewed in Inci Otker-Robe et al, “The Too-Important-to 
Fail Conundrum,” International Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note SGN/11/12, May 2011, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1112.pdf. See also David Wheelock and Paul Wilson, “Do Large 
Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
Working Paper 2009-054E, May 2011, http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2009/2009-054.pdf. 
56 According to Hamilton Place Strategies, the largest syndicated loan in 2012 involved underwriting by the four largest 
U.S. banks and two foreign banks. See Hamilton Place Strategies, “Banking on Our Future,” HPSinsight, February 
2013. 
57 These benefits are also discussed in Hamilton Place Strategies, “Banking on Our Future,” HPSinsight, February 
2013. 
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Alternatively, if success of large firms comes primarily through the ability to extract monopoly 
rents, size restrictions could improve economic efficiency.58 While reducing size should reduce 
systemic risk, there is mixed evidence on whether large firms are more or less likely to fail than 
small firms.59 They could be less likely to fail because of greater diversification or more 
sophisticated risk management. Canada’s unique experience in avoiding the recent financial crisis 
is attributed by some to its highly concentrated banking system.60 
Unless rules to limit the size of financial firms are global, size restrictions could place U.S. firms 
at a disadvantage at home and abroad in their competition with foreign financial firms. (Some 
types of financial activities can be performed abroad more easily than others, so the relevance of 
this factor depends on the activity in question.) If business were to shift to large foreign firms, the 
overall level of systemic risk in the financial system (which already involves large international 
capital flows) may not decline, or could even increase if prudential regulation in the foreign 
firm’s home country were inferior to U.S. regulation.  
An alternative to restricting size would be to penalize size through a tax or assessment on assets 
or liabilities above a stated threshold. In theory, the tax could be set at the rate that would 
neutralize any funding advantage that a bank enjoys because of its TBTF status. Given that it is 
uncertain at what size a financial firm becomes TBTF, a tax could be viewed as less harmful than 
a cap if set at the wrong threshold and perhaps more easily adjusted over time. Other policy 
options that raise funding costs for large firms, such as higher capital requirements, can be 
viewed as having a similar effect to a tax.61 
If policy makers decided to reduce the size of firms, a phase-in or transition period might be 
desirable to avoid significant short-term disruptions to the overall financial system. Likewise, 
when designing a policy that applies only to firms above a size threshold, one consideration is 
whether to make the threshold graduated to avoid cliff effects. Otherwise, firms might take 
actions to remain just below the threshold. 
Policy Response 
Section 121 of the Dodd-Frank Act allows the Federal Reserve to prevent mergers and 
acquisitions, restrict the products a firm is allowed to offer, terminate activities, and sell assets if 
the Federal Reserve and at least two-thirds of the Financial Stability Oversight Council believes 
that a firm that has more than $50 billion in assets poses a “grave threat to the financial stability 
of the United States.” It does not allow the Fed to undertake these actions simply because a firm 
is large. Before the crisis, a BHC was limited to holding no more than 10% of national deposits 
and 30% of any state’s deposits.  
                                                 
58 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Study and Recommendations Regarding Concentration Limits on Large 
Financial Companies, January 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Study%20on%20Concentration%20Limits%20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf. 
59 See Thorsten Beck, “Bank Competition and Financial Stability, Friends or Foes?,” in Competition in the Financial 
Sector, Bank Indonesia and Banco de Mexico, 2008; Antonio Ruiz-Porras, “Banking competition and financial 
fragility: Evidence from panel-data, Estudios Economicos, vol. 23, no. 1, 2008. 
60 See Renee Haltom, “Why Was Canada Exempt From the Financial Crisis?, Economic Focus, Fourth Quarter, 2013, 
p. 22. 
61 See Jeremy Stein, “Regulating Large Financial Institutions,” speech at the International Monetary Fund, April 17, 
2013. 
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Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act prevents mergers or consolidations that would result in a firm 
with more than 10% of total liabilities of certain financial firms or, in the case of a bank, 10% of 
the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States. This limit can 
be waived in the case of the acquisition of a failing firm. The limit does not prevent firms from 
increasing their market share “organically.” The FSOC has determined that Section 622 will limit 
the acquisitions of only the four largest bank holding companies at this time.62 A proposed rule 
implementing the limit was released in May 2014.63 
The Dodd-Frank Act allowed fees to be assessed on banks with more than $50 billion in assets 
and non-banks designated as systemically important. The fees were intended to finance the costs 
of supervision and resolution, as well as the budget of the Office of Financial Research, as 
opposed to being punitive, however. 
Limiting the Scope of Financial Firms 
Options 
The activities in which bank subsidiaries may engage are restricted by statute, but bank holding 
companies may own non-bank subsidiaries.64 The subsidiaries of, and off-balance sheet entities 
associated with, the largest BHCs are active participants, to varying degrees, in multiple lines of 
business outside of traditional bank lending, including asset-backed securitization, trust services, 
insurance, money market mutual funds, and broker-dealers.65 A large firm’s presence throughout 
the financial system is one source of its “interconnectedness.” 
Imposing a size restriction on firms is relatively straightforward—it requires establishing a 
measure of size, identifying the threshold size that makes a firm TBTF, and preventing firms from 
exceeding that threshold. Altering firms so that they are not too interconnected to fail is more 
complicated because there is less consensus on what characteristics make a firm “too 
interconnected.”66 If interconnectedness is taken to mean that the firm is an important participant 
in several different segments of financial markets, then policy makers could take what has 
popularly been described as the “reinstate Glass-Steagall” approach.67 The essence of this 
proposal is to prevent a single financial holding company from operating in multiple lines of 
                                                 
62 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Study and Recommendations Regarding Concentration Limits on Large 
Financial Companies, January 2011, p. 8, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Study%20on%20Concentration%20Limits%20on%20Large%20Firms%2001-17-11.pdf. 
63 It can be accessed at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140508a.htm. 
64 For more information, see the Appendix. 
65 Tobias Adrian and Adam Ashcraft, “Shadow Banking: A Review of the Literature,” Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, Staff Report no. 580, October 2012. 
66 The Financial Stability Oversight Council has grappled with coming up with developing metrics for these concepts in 
its rulemaking (12 CFR Part 1310, RIN 4030-AA00). Different perspectives on defining the concepts can be found in 
the public comments to the rulemaking. See also International Monetary Fund, Bank for International Settlements, 
Financial Stability Board, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and 
Instruments, report, October 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. 
67 Reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act in its entirety would involve many other policy areas as well that have changed 
significantly over time. Proponents of reinstating Glass-Steagall are usually understood to be focused on four key 
provisions. For more information, see CRS Report R41181, Permissible Securities Activities of Commercial Banks 
Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), by David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen 
Murphy. 
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financial business, echoing Glass-Steagall’s separation of banking and investing.68 Reintroducing 
the separation of lines of business alone would not necessarily prevent the existence of very large 
or interconnected firms within a market segment, however, in which case the TBTF problem 
would not be eliminated.  
The benefits of reducing the scope of firms are that, if successful, it could reduce the riskiest 
activities of large firms and thus the need for future “bailouts” stemming from TBTF. It could 
also reduce the complexity of large firms, making it easier for regulators and creditors to monitor 
them. Weighed against those benefits would be a number of costs. 
First, there may be economies of scope that make the financial system more efficient and 
complete if firms are large, diversified, and interconnected. Customers may benefit from the 
convenience, sophistication, and savings of “one-stop shopping” and expertise in multiple market 
segments. 
Second, large firms that operate in multiple lines of business may be better able to reduce risk 
through diversification, making them less prone to instability in that sense. Traditional banking is 
not inherently safe, so forbidding banks from engaging in other activities is no panacea to avoid 
bank failures. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are examples of firms that were deemed “too big to 
fail” and rescued on those grounds although their business was narrowly focused in the mortgage 
market.  
Third, reintroducing Glass-Steagall separations of businesses without other changes to the 
regulatory system would reinforce a system in which banking is subject to close federal 
prudential regulation and other financial firms are not. This system would only mitigate systemic 
risk if non-banking activities and institutions could not be a source of systemic risk—the recent 
crisis experience casts doubt on that assumption. Further, the growth in “shadow banking” makes 
it more difficult to segregate activities and their regulation by charter—financial innovation has 
blurred the distinction between different lines of business in finance to the point where the 
distinction may not be meaningful. In other words, some activities of non-banks are not 
fundamentally different from core banking activities from an economic perspective. Thus, the 
activities that banks could undertake would be limited, but it would be difficult to prevent non-
banks from engaging in bank-like activities with the same implications for systemic risk, but less 
or no prudential regulation. Similar arguments apply to the potential for activities to migrate 
abroad, where “universal banking” is common. 
Another policy approach would be to limit or ban TBTF firms’ participation in activities that are 
deemed inherently too risky—particularly those likely to generate large losses at times of 
financial stress—and not central to the business model of the firm. This approach usually focuses 
on banks because of their access to the “federal safety net” (deposit insurance and Fed lending), 
and hence justified in terms of limiting risk to taxpayers. For example, many policy makers have 
argued that banks should not participate in proprietary trading of private securities with the bank’s 
own funds.69 Although all financial activities are risky, some risks can be more easily managed 
through techniques such as hedging and supervised by regulators. Whether proprietary trading is 
                                                 
68 Under current law, there are still limits on the types of business activities that banking subsidiaries can undertake, but 
non-banking subsidiaries within the same holding company may operate in different lines of financial business. 
69 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Study and Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading, January 
2011, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.  
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an inherently riskier activity than other banking functions, such as lending, is subject to debate. In 
addition to proprietary trading, Thomas Hoenig and Charles Morris have proposed to also ban 
banks from acting as broker-dealers and market-makers in securities and derivatives.70  
Another variation of this proposal, made by the Vickers Commission in the United Kingdom71 
and the Liikanen Group in the European Union,72 is to “ring fence” banking activities from these 
other types of activities into legally, financially, and operationally separate entities within a 
holding company structure.73 This type of approach can be seen in U.S. policies to move swap 
dealer activities outside of the depository subsidiary and into a separately capitalized subsidiary 
(referred to as “the swap push out rule”).74 Similarly to proprietary trading, a challenge to this 
approach is to differentiate between derivatives activities that regulators want depository 
subsidiaries to engage in, such as risk-mitigating hedging, and the targeted activities, such as 
swap dealing. 
Although proposals limiting scope would apply to both large and small banks, some are likely to 
have a greater impact on large firms. For example, Bloomberg Government estimates that over 
99% of trading assets and liabilities are held by 25 banks.75  
A drawback to limiting permissible activities is that there is unlikely to be any sharp distinction 
between the risky activity and similar activities that are central to the firm’s core activities. As a 
result, regulators may have to make arbitrary distinctions between which activities fall under the 
ban, and firms would have an incentive to skirt the ban by designing transactions that resemble 
allowed activities but accomplish the same goals as the banned activity. For example, proprietary 
trading (“playing the market” with a firm’s own assets) may be hard to distinguish from market-
making (providing clients with a ready buyer and seller of securities) or hedging (buying and 
selling securities such as derivatives to reduce risk), and there may be economies of scale to 
market-making that concentrate those activities at large firms.76 Finally, risky activities may still 
be a source of systemic risk even if banks or TBTFs are banned from conducting them. 
Policy Response 
Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, popularly referred to as the “Volcker Rule,” prohibits banks 
from engaging in proprietary trading and owning hedge funds and private equity funds in the 
United States, and requires additional capital to be held by systemically important non-banks that 
                                                 
70 Thomas Hoenig and Charles Morris, “Restructuring the Banking System to Improve Safety and Soundness,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, working paper, December 2012. 
71 Independent Commission on Banking, Interim Report, United Kingdom, April 2011. 
72 High-level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU banking Sector Chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Final 
Report, European Union, October 2, 2012. 
73 In the United States, some have argued that each subsidiary within a holding company should be made legally and 
operationally separate. See, for example, Sheila Bair, Bull by the Horns, Simon and Schuster, (New York, NY: 2012), 
p. 329; Brad Miller, “Use Stand-Alone Subsidiaries to Break Up Megabanks,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2012. 
74 The term swaps refers to over-the-counter derivatives. It is statutorily defined in 7 USC 1a(47). 
75 Cady North, “Volcker Rule Risk Concentrated in 25 Banks,” Bloomberg Government, October 14, 2011, p. 5.  
76 See American Bankers Association, Letter to Alastair Fitzpayne: Information on the FSOC Notice 2010-0002, 
November 3, 2010, http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/news/VolckerTrust11410.pdf; SIFMA, Volcker Rule, 
http://www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/volcker-rule/position/. 
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engage in proprietary trading or own hedge funds and private equity funds in the United States.77 
Insurance companies are excluded from the Volcker Rule. Exemptions from the Volcker Rule 
include the purchase and sale of assets for purposes of underwriting, market making, hedging, 
and on behalf of clients. Securities issued by federal, state, or local governments and government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are exempted, as are investments in small business investment 
companies. A final rule implementing the Volcker Rule was adopted in December 2013, with 
conformance required by June 2015.78  
Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires banks to “push out” certain swap dealer activities 
into separately capitalized affiliates.79 The stated goal of the provision is to prevent swap dealers 
and major swap participants from accessing deposit insurance or the Fed’s discount window. The 
rule implementing Section 716 was effective July 2013, with a two-year transition period.80 
Regulating TBTF 
Options 
Another approach to addressing the TBTF problem takes as its starting point that no policy can 
prevent TBTF firms from emerging. In this view, the dominant role of a few firms in key 
segments of the financial system is unavoidable. Breaking them up or eliminating all spillover 
effects is unlikely to be practical or feasible, for reasons discussed elsewhere. If so, regulation 
could be used to try to counteract the moral hazard problem and reduce the likelihood of their 
failure. Prudential regulation, such as capital requirements, could be set to hold TBTF firms to 
higher standards than other financial firms, whether or not those firms are already subject to 
prudential regulation.  
A framework for prudential regulation is well established in depository banking regulation, 
featuring the setting of safety and soundness standards and regulatory supervision to ensure 
adherence to those standards. Historically, banks have been subject to a closer and more intense 
federal prudential regulatory regime than non-banks because of the systemic risk and moral 
hazard problems they posed. Some argue that banks generate unique sources of systemic risk 
(such as deposit taking) that have no analogue in other types of financial firms.81 If the recent 
crisis leads to the conclusion that TBTF non-bank financial firms can also be sources of systemic 
risk and contagion, the same arguments made for regulating banks for systemic risk also apply to 
TBTF non-banks, however.82  
                                                 
77 For more information, see CRS Report R41298, The “Volcker Rule”: Proposals to Limit “Speculative” Proprietary 
Trading by Banks, by David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy. 
78 Available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm. 
79 For more information, see CRS Report R41398, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: 
Title VII, Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller and Kathleen Ann Ruane. 
80 Available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130605a.htm. 
81 The potential for each type of financial firm to be a source of systemic risk is evaluated in Douglas Elliot, 
“Regulating Systemically Important Financial Institutions That Are Not Banks,” Brookings Institution, working paper, 
May 9, 2013, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/09-regulating-financial-institutions-
elliott. 
82 Whether all non-bank firms or only TBTF ones performing a given financial activity are important sources of 
systemic risk is beyond the scope of this report, but if all were, a case could be made that a prudential regulatory regime 
should be applied uniformly to all such firms, and not just large ones. 
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There are a wide variety of types of large non-banks, with diverse features. Some non-banks have 
some of the features that have been viewed as a source of systemic risk, such as leverage and 
vulnerability to runs, while others do not. There are a few large insurers, which are already 
regulated for safety and soundness at the state level. On the other hand, state regulators may not 
be equipped to regulate non-insurance subsidiaries or the overall firm for systemic risk. A study 
by the Office of Financial Research (OFR) identified several channels through which “asset 
managers”—a diverse group that includes hedge funds, pension funds, and mutual funds—could 
pose systemic risks. Others have argued that only activities, not firms, in this industry pose 
systemic risk. The OFR report identified 10 asset managers each with more than $1 trillion in 
assets under management.83  
A “one size fits all” model for regulating firms in different businesses for safety and soundness is 
unlikely to be practical. Bringing non-banks under the purview of bank regulators raises questions 
about whether rules designed for banks can be applied to non-banks, and whether the federal bank 
regulators have the expertise to do so effectively. For example, insurers have argued that bank 
regulations are not suitable for them and the Fed does not have any specialized expertise in the 
area of insurance. Another issue is whether to regulate all of the activities of holding companies 
operating across several lines of business for safety and soundness, or regulate only certain 
activities that are deemed systemically important, perhaps with legal and financial “firewalls” that 
isolate the risks of non-regulated activities to the overall holding company.  
Regulation cannot prevent all failures from occurring—large, regulated depository institutions 
failed during the crisis. Nor is a system without any failures necessarily a desirable one, since risk 
is inherent in all financial activities. Regulation could aim to prevent large financial firms from 
taking greater risks than their smaller counterparts because of moral hazard. If successful, fewer 
failures or episodes involving disruptive losses would occur. If effective, monitoring by regulators 
might be more economically efficient than monitoring by creditors and counterparties, where a 
free rider problem reduces the incentive to monitor. In addition, regulators potentially have 
greater access to relevant information on risk than creditors and counterparties if opacity is a 
problem with large, complex firms. 
This proposal relies on effective regulation by the same regulators who were arguably unable or 
unwilling to prevent excessive risk taking before and during the crisis by at least a few of the 
firms that they regulated.84 Although regulation is intended to limit risky behavior, regulators may 
inadvertently cause greater correlation of losses across firms by encouraging all firms to engage 
in similar behavior. Some have argued that large firms are “too complex to regulate,” meaning 
regulators are incapable of identifying or understanding the risks inherent in complicated 
transactions and corporate structures. For example, the six largest BHCs had more than 1,000 
subsidiaries and the two largest had more than 3,000 each in 2012. Further, their complexity has 
increased over time—only one BHC had more than 500 subsidiaries in 1990, and the share of 
assets held outside of depository subsidiaries has grown over time for the largest BHCs.85 One 
                                                 
83 See Office of Financial Research, Asset Management and Financial Stability, September 2013, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Documents/OFR_AMFS_FINAL.pdf; Douglas Elliott, “Systemic Risk 
and the Asset Management Industry,” Brookings Institution, May 2014. 
84 This is discussed in more detail in the Appendix. See also Arthur Wilmarth, “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and 
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem,” Oregon Law Review, vol. 89, April 6, 2011, p. 951. 
85 Dafna Avraham, et al., “Peeling the Onion: A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,” Liberty Street 
Economics, July 20, 2012, available at http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/07/peeling-the-onion-a-
structural-view-of-us-bank-holding-companies.html#.U-TnELFgi68. 
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response to addressing this complexity is by making the regulatory regime more sophisticated, 
but some critics argue that this approach is likely to backfire.86 One challenge for the effective 
regulation of non-banks that are TBTF is that regulators have less experience with business lines 
other than banking, and thus may initially lack the expertise to regulate them effectively. Others 
have argued that large firms are “too big to jail,” meaning regulators cannot take effective 
supervisory actions against firms if those actions would undermine the firm’s financial health, and 
thus financial stability.87 
One way that a regulatory approach could potentially backfire is if a special regulatory regime for 
TBTF firms is not strict enough, in which case it would exacerbate the moral hazard problem. 
Critics fear that such a regime would be particularly vulnerable to “regulatory capture,” the 
phenomenon in which the regulated exercise influence over their regulators to ease the burden of 
regulation. If so, a special regulatory regime could wind up exacerbating the moral hazard 
problem by, in effect, making TBTF status explicit, signaling to market participants that firms in 
the special regime enjoyed a protected status and would not be allowed to fail.88 Instead of 
increasing the cost of being TBTF, firms in the special regulatory regime could end up borrowing 
at a lower cost than other firms (since, in effect, these firms would enjoy a lower risk of default). 
Many would point to the experience with the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, before 
conservatorship as a historical example of how a special regulatory regime could backfire. The 
GSEs could borrow at a lower cost than other firms because markets believed that the 
government would not let them fail—they enjoyed even lower borrowing costs than firms that 
markets might believe were implicitly TBTF but not chartered by the government like the 
GSEs.89 Institutional shortcomings, critics argue, led to regulatory capture.90 The GSEs were 
subject to their own unique capital requirements, set by statute, under which they were found well 
capitalized by their regulator at the time, OFHEO, two months before being taken into 
conservatorship.91 Yet compared with depositories, GSEs held little capital, were not well 
diversified, and experienced large losses during the crisis. The worst-case scenario of opponents 
of a separate regulatory regime for TBTF firms is that such a regime would provide a competitive 
advantage that would enable more risk taking than before. An example of this scenario was the 
GSEs’ ability to borrow at lower cost than other firms. 
Adopting these measures may increase overall costs in the financial system, but in the presence of 
TBTF, market costs may otherwise be too low from a societal perspective, since risk-taking is too 
high. For example, requiring loans to be backed with more capital may make lending more 
expensive and less available, but make the firm less likely to fail. If more capital succeeded in 
creating a more stable financial system, then the availability of credit could be less volatile over 
                                                 
86 See, for example, Thomas Hoenig, “Back to Basics: A Better Alternative to Basel Capital Rules,” Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, speech delivered to the American Banker Regulatory Symposium, September 14, 2012. 
87 This issue was discussed by the Attorney General at a 2013 hearing. See U.S. Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, 113th Cong., 1st sess., March 6, 2013. 
88 During the debate of the Dodd-Frank Act, policy makers considered keeping the identities of regulated firms 
confidential, but they concluded that this would be impractical. 
89 Congressional Budget Office, Measuring the Capital Positions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, June 2006. 
90 For an in-depth discussion, see the section in the Appendix entitled “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” 
91 Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Capital,” Mortgage Market Note 08-
2, July 17, 2008. 
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time. At least partly offsetting the higher costs of capital for firms designated as systemically 
important would be relatively lower costs of capital for other firms.92 
Even if a heightened prudential regime worked as planned, it could still partly backfire from a 
systemic risk perspective. To the extent that it causes financial intermediation to migrate away 
from TBTF firms to firms that are not regulated for safety and soundness, the result could be a 
less regulated financial system. 
Policy Response 
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act grants the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) the 
authority to identify “systemically important” non-bank financial firms (SIFI) by a two-thirds 
vote, which must be supported by the Treasury Secretary. Such a firm would be deemed 
systemically important on the basis of a council determination that “material financial distress at 
the [firm] or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the 
activities of the [firm] could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” Foreign 
financial firms operating in the United States could be identified by the council as systemically 
important. Firms with consolidated assets of less than $50 billion are exempted. Besides the $50 
billion threshold, FSOC stated in its final rule that it would consider designating only firms with 
at least $30 billion in gross notional credit default swaps outstanding in which it was the reference 
entity, $3.5 billion of derivatives liabilities, $20 billion in debt outstanding, a 15 to 1 leverage 
ratio (a capital-asset ratio that is not risk-weighted), or a 10% short-term debt ratio.93  
To date, FSOC has designated two insurers (AIG and Prudential) and another non-bank (GE 
Capital) as SIFIs.94 According to the insurer MetLife, FSOC has proposed to designate it as 
well.95 FSOC has investigated whether any “asset managers” (a diverse group that includes 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds) are systemically important, but has not 
made any designations to date. 
Under Subtitle C of Title I, the Fed is the prudential regulator for firms that the FSOC has 
designated as a SIFI and any BHC with total consolidated assets of $50 billion. (The FSOC and 
Fed may raise the asset threshold above $50 billion.) There are currently about 30 U.S. BHCs 
with more than $50 billion in consolidated assets.96 BHCs that participated in the Capital 
Purchase Program (part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program) would not be able to change their 
                                                 
92 Assuming that the overall supply of credit remained constant, raising the cost of capital at TBTF firms would reduce 
the amount of credit supplied to those firms, thereby increasing the supply of credit available to other firms. Economic 
theory predicts that the greater supply of credit available to other firms would reduce their cost of capital. 
93 FSOC issued a final rule in April 2012. It can be accessed at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/rulemaking/
Documents/
Authority%20to%20Require%20Supervision%20and%20Regulation%20of%20Certain%20Nonbank%20Financial%20
Companies.pdf. 
94 Financial Stability Oversight Council, “Council Names Two Companies for Consolidated Supervision and Enhanced 
Prudential Standards,” press release, July 9, 2013. 
95 MetLife, press release, September 4, 2014, https://www.metlife.com/about/press-room/index.html?compID=140852. 
96 A current list of top 50 depositories by asset size is available at http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/
Top50Form.aspx. Some of the firms on this list are not bank holding companies. Other types of depositories, such as 
savings and loan holding companies, with more than $50 billion in assets are not subject to the final rule, but the Fed 
has indicated that it intends to propose rulemaking in the future that apply to them. There are no official data on the 
largest financial firms that are not depositories. 
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charter to avoid this regulatory regime. A large number of foreign banks operating in the United 
States are also subject to the enhanced prudential regime.97 Foreign banks operating with more 
than $50 billion in assets in the United States are required to set up intermediate bank holding 
companies that will be subject to heightened standards comparable to those applied to U.S. banks. 
Less stringent requirements apply to large foreign banks with less than $50 billion in assets in the 
United States. The Fed, with the FSOC’s advice, is required to set safety and soundness standards 
that are more stringent than those applicable to other nonbank financial firms and BHCs that do 
not pose a systemic risk. At the recommendation of the council or on its own initiative, the Fed 
may set different standards for different systemically important firms or categories of firms based 
on various risk-related factors. Fees are assessed on banks and non-banks regulated under this 
regime to finance the costs of supervision, as well as the budget of the Office of Financial 
Research.  
The final rule implementing Subtitle C was adopted in February 2014, and banks must be in 
compliance by January 1, 2015.98 The final rule includes requirements for stress tests, capital 
planning, and risk management. The final rule also requires any bank with more than $50 billion 
in assets to comply with a 15 to 1 debt to equity limit in the event that the FSOC has determined 
that it poses a “grave threat” to financial stability. Exposure limits of 25% of a company’s capital 
per single counterparty were included in the proposed rule, but the Fed has indicated that it plans 
to finalize them at a later date. Capital and liquidity standards for the largest banks have been set 
separately through the Basel III rules, discussed below; enhanced capital requirements have not 
been required of all BHCs with $50 billion or more in assets. Other prudential standards may be 
applied at the Fed’s discretion. 
In addition, Section 171 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the “Collins Amendment”) requires the Fed to 
set capital requirements at the holding company level for non-bank SIFIs and all bank or savings 
and loan holding companies that are no lower than those applied to banking subsidiaries. For 
companies with small or no banking subsidiaries, most of the required capital may be based on 
the activities of and provided by the non-bank subsidiaries. Previously, capital requirements (if 
there were any) were determined at the subsidiary level by that subsidiary’s primary regulator. 
There are various exceptions to and phase-in periods for this requirement, including an exemption 
for small holding companies. As BHC regulator, the Fed has not yet determined how to apply the 
Collins Amendment to insurers, who use different methods to measure capital requirements from 
banks, or other non-banks. 
In conjunction with the Dodd-Frank Act, Basel III, a non-binding international agreement on 
bank regulation that the United States is in the process of implementing,99 required that 
global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) must have higher loss absorbency 
capacity to reflect the greater risks that they pose to the financial system. The Committee has 
developed a methodology that includes both quantitative indicators and qualitative elements 
to identify global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The additional loss absorbency 
                                                 
97 CRS was not able to locate an official list of banks subject to Title I enhanced supervision. About 130 banks (foreign 
and domestic) have submitted resolution plans (“living wills”) pursuant to Title I, however. See Martin Gruenberg, 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, September 9, 2014, p. 5. 
98 The rule can be accessed at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140218a.htm. 
99 Many provisions of the Basel III Accord were adopted in rulemaking in July 2013. The 2013 final rule does not 
include the capital surcharge for G-SIBs, which regulators have announced will be proposed at a later date. For more 
information, see http://federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/USImplementation.htm. 
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requirements are to be met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital 
requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5%, depending on a bank’s systemic importance. For 
banks facing the highest SIB surcharge, an additional loss absorbency of 1% could be 
applied as a disincentive to increase materially their global systemic importance in the 
future.100 
In addition, Basel III creates a counter-cyclical capital buffer that can be modified over the 
business cycle and a supplementary leverage ratio incorporating off-balance sheet assets, both of 
which will be applied to only the largest banks (specifically, those subject to the “Advanced 
Approaches” Rule). In September 2014, the banking regulators finalized a rule implementing 
Basel’s liquidity coverage ratio, applying it to banks with $250 billion or more in assets or $10 
billion or more in on-balance sheet exposure, and a less stringent version of the rule to banks with 
$50 billion or more in assets. The rule does not apply to non-bank SIFIs, but regulators indicated 
that non-bank SIFIs would face their own liquidity requirements. The liquidity coverage ratio 
would require firms to hold enough liquid assets to meet cash flow needs during a stress period.101 
Since 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international forum that coordinates the work 
of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies, has annually designated 
G-SIBs, based on the banks’ cross-jurisdictional activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutability, 
and complexity.102 The FSB has currently designated 29 banks as G-SIBs. Table 2 lists the eight 
G-SIBs that are headquartered in the United States, and the capital surcharge under Basel III 
recommended by the FSB. In addition, several of the foreign G-SIBs have U.S. subsidiaries. The 
identified firms are required to meet resolution planning requirements.103 The FSB has proposed 
that firms identified as G-SIBs in 2014 meet the capital surcharge requirements beginning in 
2016, fully phasing them in by January 2019. The G20, including the U.S. government, endorsed 
the FSB’s non-binding proposal.  
Table 2. U.S. Banks Identified as G-SIBs and Capital Surcharge 
Recommended by the FSB 
(surcharge as a % of risk-weighted assets) 
U.S. Financial Firm 
Capital Surcharge as a % of 
Risk-Weighted Assets 
Citigroup 2.5% 
JP Morgan Chase 2.5% 
Bank of America 1.5% 
Bank of New York Mellon 1.5% 
Goldman Sachs 1.5% 
Morgan Stanley 1.5% 
                                                 
100 Bank for International Settlements, Basel III Summary Table, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf. 
101 The final rule can be accessed here: http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20140903a1.pdf. 
102 Financial Stability Board, “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” November 4, 
2011, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf. The identification methodology is described 
in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology,” 
Consultative Document, July 2011, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201.pdf. 
103 Financial Stability Board, “2013 Update of Global Systemically Important Banks,” November 11, 2013, 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131111.pdf. 
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U.S. Financial Firm 
Capital Surcharge as a % of 
Risk-Weighted Assets 
State Street 1.0% 
Wells Fargo 1.0% 
Source: Financial Stability Board. 
In April 2014, the U.S. bank regulators adopted a joint rule that would require these eight banks 
to meet a supplementary leverage ratio of 5% in order to pay all discretionary bonuses and capital 
distributions and 6% in order to be considered well capitalized as of 2018.104 The supplementary 
leverage ratio includes off-balance sheet exposures.  
In addition, the Financial Stability Board has identified nine insurers as “globally systemically 
important insurers,” three of whom (AIG, Prudential, and MetLife) are headquartered in the 
United States.105 Designated insurers will be required to develop recovery and resolution plans 
and hold more capital than other insurers by 2019. The FSB has released a methodology for 
identifying global systemically important firms that are not banks or insurers, but has not 
designated any to date.106 Some Members of Congress have been concerned that the FSB 
designation process is superseding the national designation process established by the Dodd-
Frank Act.107 
Minimize Spillover Effects 
Options 
A criticism of regulation before the crisis was that regulators did not focus enough on how a 
firm’s failure would affect its counterparties or broader financial conditions, or conversely, 
whether a firm could withstand a crisis situation. Another approach holds that if firms are TBTF 
because their failure would cause spillover effects that would impair the overall financial system, 
then instead of altering the TBTF firm, regulators should try to neutralize spillover effects to the 
point where the failure of a firm would not impair the broader financial system. According to this 
view, once creditors believed that a firm could now safely be allowed to fail regardless of its size 
or interconnectedness, the moral hazard problem associated with TBTF would vanish.  
One way spillover effects occur is through counterparty risk (the risk of losses because a 
counterparty in a transaction cannot fulfill its obligations). Examples of how counterparty risk can 
be reduced include moving transactions to clearinghouses and exchanges, requiring 
capital/margins for transactions, requiring risk exposures to be hedged, and placing limits on 
                                                 
104 The rule applies to all banks with more than $700 billion in assets, and was set at that level to include all banks 
designated as G-SIBs. The rule can be viewed at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140408a.htm. 
105 Financial Stability Board, “Global Systemically Important Insurers and the Policy Measures That Will Apply to 
Them,” July 18, 2013, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130718.pdf. The Financial Stability Board 
is an international forum of which the United States is a member. A list of the U.S. firms can be found in the section 
below entitled “Regulating TBTF.” 
106 Financial Stability Board, “Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer Global Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions,” January 8, 2014, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_140108.htm. 
107 Hon. Jeb Hensarling et al, “Letter to Secretary Lew, Chair White, and Chair Yellen,” May 9, 2014. 
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exposure to specific counterparties (transactions, debt, equity holdings, etc.).108 Adopting these 
measures may increase overall costs in the financial system. For example, counterparty limits 
could reduce liquidity and raise costs for transactions that are not standardized enough to be 
traded on exchanges. In the presence of TBTF, however, market costs may otherwise be too low 
from a society-wide perspective, because firms lack the proper incentives to monitor or price in 
counterparty risk. 
A drawback to this approach is that spillover effects cannot always be identified beforehand. If 
counterparty exposure were transparent, in theory all market participants could hedge themselves 
against failure ahead of time and the failure would not have contagion effects, or at least the 
government could manage the exposure to prevent contagion. In practice, linkages have proven 
complex and opaque, and the sources of contagion have proven hard to predict. For example, in 
September 2008, policy makers reasoned that market participants and policy makers had had 
several months after the rescue of Bear Stearns to prepare for the failure of Lehman Brothers 
(indicators such as credit default swaps had signaled an elevated risk of default for months), so 
allowing it to enter bankruptcy should not be disruptive.109 Nevertheless, few anticipated that 
Lehman Brothers’ failure would lead to a run on money markets, which proved highly disruptive 
to commercial paper markets, causing financing problems for many financial and non-financial 
issuers.  
Identifying spillover effects is likely to be more difficult if a firm is not already regulated for 
safety and soundness. Without a prudential regulator closely monitoring the firm’s activities and 
examining its counterparties, it is less likely that policy makers could quickly and accurately 
identify who would be exposed to a firm’s failure. Much of the necessary information to make 
that judgment is unlikely to be publicly available.  
Another problem is that some solutions shift, rather than eliminate, counterparty risk. For 
example, moving certain activities onto an exchange or clearinghouse may cause that entity to 
become “too interconnected to fail.” 
Policy Response 
The Federal Reserve’s Regulation F (12 C.F.R., Part 206)—in place before the crisis—limits 
counterparty exposure for depository institutions. Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act allows the Fed to 
set exposure limits of 25% of a company’s capital per counterparty for firms designated as 
systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.110 To date, a rule 
implementing this exposure limit has been proposed but not finalized. To reduce counterparty 
risk, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act requires certain swaps, particularly those that involve large 
financial institutions, to be moved onto clearinghouses or exchanges.111 Title VIII of the Dodd-
Frank Act allows the Financial Stability Oversight Council to identify certain payment, clearing, 
and settlement systems and activities as systemically important “financial market utilities,” and 
                                                 
108 Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, Too Big to Fail (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press), 2004. 
109 An alternative view is that Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy was more disruptive because the rescue of Bear Stearns 
led creditors to conclude that other large investment banks would also be rescued. 
110 The Fed has issued a proposed rule to implement these standards, which can be accessed at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20111220a1.pdf. 
111 For more information, see CRS Report R41398, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: 
Title VII, Derivatives, by Rena S. Miller and Kathleen Ann Ruane. 
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allows the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission, or Commodity and Futures 
Trading Commission to regulate those systems and activities for enhanced prudential supervision. 
It also allows systemically important systems to borrow from the Fed in “unusual or exigent 
circumstances.” In 2012, regulators issued a final rule implementing Title VIII and designated 
eight financial market utilities as systemically important.112 
Resolving a Large, Interconnected Failing Firm 
Options 
Prior to the financial crisis, failing banks were resolved through the FDIC’s resolution regime, 
while certain other financial firms, such as broker-dealers, were resolved through the corporate 
bankruptcy system.113 Bankruptcy is a judicial process initiated by creditors in order to recover 
debts and other liabilities, while the FDIC’s resolution regime is an administrative process 
initiated by the FDIC. Examples of the types of powers that the FDIC can exercise to resolve a 
depository include transferring and freezing assets, paying obligations, repudiating contracts, and 
obtaining judicial stays.114  
The FDIC typically resolves failed banks through the “purchase and assumption” method, under 
which the bank is closed and some or all of the assets and deposits of the failed bank are sold to 
healthy banks.115 If losses are too large to be absorbed by creditors, they are absorbed by the 
FDIC’s deposit insurance fund, which is pre-funded through assessments on depositories. The 
purchase and assumption method avoids open-ended government assistance and keeps the FDIC 
out of the business of running banks, but an unintended consequence is that it encourages greater 
concentration, since the only entity capable of absorbing a large failed bank is likely to be an even 
larger institution.  
One rationale behind a resolution regime for banks is that the need to safeguard federally insured 
deposits (which can be withdrawn rapidly) requires a swift resolution and gives the FDIC, which 
insures the deposits, priority over other creditors. Prompt corrective action and least cost 
resolution requirements are intended to minimize losses to the FDIC. The FDIC may initiate a 
resolution before failure has occurred—thereby limiting losses to the FDIC and other creditors—
whereas a bankruptcy process cannot be initiated by creditors until default has occurred.  
Another example of a resolution regime is the one applied to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Their 
regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), assumed control of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in September 2008 when FHFA determined that they were critically 
undercapitalized. Since then, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have operated under government 
                                                 
112 For more information, see CRS Report R41529, Supervision of U.S. Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems: 
Designation of Financial Market Utilities (FMUs), by Marc Labonte. 
113 For more information, see CRS Report R40530, Insolvency of Systemically Significant Financial Companies 
(SSFCs): Bankruptcy vs. Conservatorship/Receivership, by David H. Carpenter. 
114 See CRS Report RL34657, Financial Institution Insolvency: Federal Authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
Depository Institutions, by David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy. 
115 For more information on purchase and assumption and other resolution methods, see the section below entitled 
“Resolution of Banks Before and After the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act.” 
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conservatorship and received quarterly financial transfers from the Treasury to remain solvent 
until 2012.116 
Part of what makes some financial firms too big to fail is the nature of the bankruptcy process, 
according to some analysts. A firm that dominates important financial market segments cannot be 
liquidated without disrupting the availability of credit, it is argued. They argue that the deliberate 
pace of the bankruptcy process is not equipped to avoid the runs and contagion inherent in the 
failure of a financial firm, and that the effects on systemic risk are not taken into account when 
decisions are made in the bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy experience of Lehman Brothers is 
viewed as evidence of why the current bankruptcy process cannot be successful for a TBTF firm.  
Proponents argue that a resolution regime for all TBTF financial firms, regardless of whether the 
firm is a depository, offers an alternative to propping up failing firms with government assistance 
(as was the case with Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008) or suffering the systemic consequences of a 
protracted and messy bankruptcy (as was the case with Lehman Brothers).117 In principle, a TBTF 
resolution regime could include a receivership process (where the government seizes control of 
the firm in order to wind it down), a conservatorship process (where the government seizes 
control in order to continue operations), or both. The FDIC’s typical treatment of a failed bank is 
an example of a receivership process; FHFA’s treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since 
2008 is an example of the conservatorship process.118 Often, banks in receivership are resolved 
through acquisitions by healthy firms. In the case of a large firm, acquisitions would result in the 
acquiring firm becoming even larger. Were one of the nation’s very largest firms to fail, it is not 
clear what firm would have the capacity to acquire it, in which case some other method of 
resolution would be necessary. 
Supporting the argument for a special resolution regime, the failures of large depositories during 
the crisis that were subject to the FDIC’s resolution regime, such as Wachovia and Washington 
Mutual, were less disruptive to the financial system than the failure of Lehman Brothers, even 
though Wachovia and Lehman Brothers were sequential (46th and 47th largest, respectively) on 
Fortune’s list of the 500 largest companies of 2007.119 (Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia before the 
FDIC formally became receiver.) Whether the resolution of a non-bank could be handled as 
smoothly as these two banks is an open question.120 
Critics argue that a resolution regime, depending on its design, could give policy makers too 
much discretionary power, which could result in higher costs to the government and preferential 
treatment of favored creditors during the resolution. In other words, it could enable “backdoor 
bailouts” that could allow government assistance to be funneled to the firm or its creditors beyond 
                                                 
116 For more information, see the section below entitled “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.” 
117 See, for example, Sheila Bair, “We Must Resolve to End Too Big to Fail,” remarks at the 47th Annual Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 5, 2011, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5_2/Article1.pdf. 
118 For more information, see CRS Report RS22950, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship, by Mark 
Jickling. 
119 For more information, see “Washington Mutual and Wachovia.” The Fortune list can be accessed at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/index.html. 
120 The FDIC gives a detailed explanation of how the failure of a firm like Lehman Brothers could have been managed 
more smoothly under a resolution regime in “The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Under the Dodd-
Frank Act,” FDIC Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 2, 2011, p. 31, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011_vol5_2/
lehman.pdf. 
Systemically Important or “Too Big to Fail” Financial Institutions 
 
Congressional Research Service 30 
what would be available in bankruptcy, perpetuating the moral hazard problem.121 The normal 
FDIC resolution regime minimizes the potential for these problems through its statutory 
requirements of least cost resolution and prompt corrective action. It would be expected that a 
resolution regime for TBTF firms, by contrast, would at times be required to subordinate a least 
cost principle to systemic risk considerations, which the FDIC regime permits. Therefore, a 
resolution could be more costly to the government than the bankruptcy process. (On the other 
hand, an administrative resolution process could potentially avoid some of the costs of 
bankruptcy, such as some legal fees and runs by creditors that further undermine the firm’s 
finances.) Critics also point to the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—who have 
received government support on an ongoing basis since 2008—as evidence that a resolution 
regime could turn out to be too open ended and be used to prop up TBTF firms as ongoing 
entities, competing with private sector rivals on an advantageous basis because of direct 
government subsidies. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 110-289) required 
mandatory receivership for the GSEs if they became insolvent, but quarterly transfers from 
Treasury prevented insolvency. As noted above, uncertainty before the fact about which firms are 
TBTF may lead policy makers to err on the side of taking more failing firms than necessary into 
the special resolution process instead of allowing them to enter bankruptcy. 
If policy makers, wary of the turmoil caused by Lehman Brothers’ failure, were unwilling to 
pursue the bankruptcy option in the future, opposing a resolution regime may be tantamount to 
tacitly accepting future “bailouts,” unless some other policy change is made that future policy 
makers view as a workable alternative. As an alternative to a special resolution regime, some 
critics call for amending the bankruptcy code to create a special chapter for complex financial 
firms to address problems that have been identified, such as a speedier process and the ability to 
reorganize.122 To some extent, these concerns are already addressed in the bankruptcy code. For 
example, the bankruptcy process already allows qualified financial contracts to be netted out. In 
the case of Lehman Brothers, healthy business units were sold to competitors relatively quickly 
through the bankruptcy process, and remain in operation today.  
Until a TBTF firm fails, it is open to debate whether a special resolution regime could 
successfully achieve what it is intended to do—shut down a failing firm without triggering 
systemic disruption. One key challenge that has been identified is the resolution of foreign 
subsidiaries.123 Given the size of the firms involved and the unanticipated transmission of 
systemic risk, it remains to be seen whether the government could impose losses on any creditors 
without triggering contagion—or would be willing to try. A receiver would face the same short-
term incentives to limit losses to creditors to limit systemic risk that caused policy makers to 
rescue firms in the recent crisis in order to restore stability. If the receiver is guided by those 
short-term incentives, the only difference between a resolution regime and a “bailout” might turn 
out to be that shareholder equity is wiped out, at presumably relatively little savings to the 
government.  
                                                 
121 See, for example, Jeffrey Lacker and John Weinberg, “Now How Large is the Safety Net?” Economic Brief 10-06, 
June 2010, http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2010/pdf/eb_10-06.pdf. 
122 See, for example, Kenneth Scott and John Taylor, “How to Let Too Big to Fail Banks Fail,” Wall Street Journal, 
May 16, 2013, p. A15; Hoover Institute, Resolution Project publications, available at http://www.hoover.org/
taskforces/economic-policy/resolution-project/publications. For a comparison, see Sabrina Pellerin and John Walter, 
“Orderly Liquidation Authority as an Alternative to Bankruptcy,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic 
Quarterly, vol. 98, no. 1, First Quarter 2012, p. 1. 
123 International Monetary Fund, “Resolution of Cross-Border Banks – A Proposed Framework for Enhanced 
Coordination,” June 2010, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/061110.pdf. 
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Policy Response 
In July 2008, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA; P.L. 110-289), 
which included provisions creating a new regulator (the Federal Housing Finance Agency or 
FHFA) for the housing GSEs (the Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac). 
The FHFA was given augmented powers to resolve the GSEs.124 Under these powers, FHFA can 
manage assets, sign contracts, terminate claims, collect obligations, and perform management 
functions. In September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered FHFA conservatorship, upon 
which FHFA took control of their operations while maintaining them as ongoing enterprises.125 
HERA also gave the Treasury Secretary unlimited authority to lend or invest in the GSEs through 
the end of 2009. This authority has been used to cover the GSEs’ losses and prevent insolvency 
during conservatorship, and funds from Treasury continued to be transferred until 2012.126 While 
existing shareholders saw their equity value plummet at the time of conservatorship, creditors and 
other counterparties have continued to be paid in full. 
Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203) requires systemically important firms (SIFIs) and 
BHCs with at least $50 billion in consolidated assets to periodically prepare resolution plans, also 
called “living wills,” explaining how they could be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner. 
Failure to submit a credible resolution plan would trigger regulatory action. Title I also creates 
early remediation requirements for non-bank SIFIs that are in financial distress (banks already 
had early remediation requirements under existing statute). 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a resolution regime for financial firms whose failure would 
have “serious adverse effects on financial stability.”127 However, subsidiaries that are insurance 
companies would be resolved under state law, certain broker-dealers would be resolved by the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation, and insured depository subsidiaries would be resolved 
under the FDIC’s traditional resolution regime. The process for taking a firm into resolution has 
multiple steps and actors. First, a group of regulators (the group varies depending on the type of 
firm, but must always include the approval of two-thirds of the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors) must make a written recommendation to the Treasury Secretary that a firm should be 
resolved, explaining why bankruptcy would be inappropriate. Second, the Treasury Secretary 
must determine that resolution is necessary to avoid a default that would pose systemic risk to the 
financial system, and default cannot be prevented through a private sector alternative. Prior 
identification by the FSOC could be used as evidence that the firm’s failure poses systemic risk, 
but it is not a necessary condition. Third, if the company disputes the Treasury Secretary’s 
findings, it has limited rights to appeal in federal court. Finally, the FDIC manages the resolution.  
The Dodd-Frank Act provides the FDIC with receivership powers, modeled on its bank 
receivership powers, with some differences, such as requirements that the FDIC consult with the 
primary regulator. As receiver, the FDIC can manage assets, sign contracts, terminate claims, 
                                                 
124 For more information, see CRS Report RL34623, Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, coordinated by N. 
Eric Weiss. 
125 For more information, see CRS Report RL34657, Financial Institution Insolvency: Federal Authority over Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Depository Institutions, by David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy. Before HERA, 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s regulator had more limited powers of conservatorship and no powers of receivership. 
126 HERA required that the GSE be put into receivership if it became insolvent. Transfers from Treasury since 2008 to 
maintain solvency have had the effect of avoiding the receivership requirement. 
127 This finding does not require the firm to have been previously designated as systemically important for Title I’s 
purposes of heightened prudential regulation. 
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collect obligations, and perform management functions. The Dodd-Frank Act sets priorities 
among classes of unsecured creditors, with senior executives and directors coming last before 
shareholders in order of priority. It requires that similarly situated creditors be treated similarly, 
unless doing so would increase the cost to the government. The FDIC is allowed to create bridge 
companies, as a way to divide good and bad assets, for a limited period of time to facilitate the 
resolution. Unlike FHFA’s resolution regime, the Dodd-Frank regime does not allow for 
conservatorship.  
The Dodd-Frank Act calls for shareholders and creditors to bear losses and management 
“responsible for the condition of the company” to be removed. The FDIC is allowed to use its 
funds to provide credit to the firm while in receivership if funding cannot be obtained from 
private credit markets. Unlike the resolution regime for banks, there is no least cost resolution 
requirement and the regime is not pre-funded (the FDIC may borrow from Treasury to finance it). 
Instead, costs that cannot be recouped in the process of resolution must be made up after the fact 
through assessments on counterparties (to the extent that their losses were smaller under 
receivership than they would have been in a traditional bankruptcy process) and risk-based 
assessments on financial firms with assets exceeding $50 billion. Since the rationale for limiting 
losses to counterparties is to prevent systemic risk, it is unclear how those counterparties could be 
assessed after the fact without also posing some systemic risk. A lack of pre-funding means that a 
firm’s resolution will, in effect, be financed by its competitors (i.e., firms with assets exceeding 
$50 billion) instead of itself. The FDIC is limited to providing assistance in the resolution up to 
10% of the failed firm’s total consolidated assets in the first 30 days of the resolution; thereafter 
the limit becomes 90% of total consolidated assets available for repayment. 
The FDIC has stated,  
the most promising resolution strategy [under Title II] from our point view will be to place 
the parent company into receivership and to pass its assets, principally investments in its 
subsidiaries, to a newly created bridge holding company. This will allow subsidiaries that are 
equity solvent and contribute to the franchise value of the firm to remain open and avoid the 
disruption that would likely accompany their closings ... . 
Equity claims of the firm’s shareholders and the claims of the subordinated and unsecured 
debt holders will be left behind in the receivership.... 
Therefore, initially, the bridge holding company will be owned by the receivership. The next 
stage in the resolution is to transfer ownership and control of the surviving franchise to 
private hands.... 
The second step will be the conversion of the debt holders’ claims to equity. The old debt 
holders of the failed parent will become the owners of the new company....128 
This approach has been dubbed “Single Point of Entry,” and the FDIC proposed a rule implementing 
it in December 2013.129 A BGOV study argues that Single Point of Entry will only mitigate moral 
hazard if the holding company holds sufficient common equity and debt that can absorb losses in 
                                                 
128 Martin J. Gruenberg, Acting Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Remarks to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Structure Conference; Chicago, IL, May 10, 2012. 
129 It can be accessed here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-18/pdf/2013-30057.pdf. For more information 
on the FDIC as receiver under Title II, see http://www.fdic.gov/resauthority/. 
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resolution at the parent level; otherwise, investors will anticipate that public funds will be used to 
absorb losses.130 
Selected Legislation in the 113th Congress 
S.Amdt. 689 to the FY2014 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 8) creates a non-binding budget 
reserve fund that allows for future legislation “related to any subsidies or funding advantage 
relative to other competitors received by bank holding companies with over $500 billion in total 
assets.... ” It was adopted by the Senate on March 22, 2013. 
H.Con.Res. 25, as amended and passed by the Senate on October 16, 2013, creates a non-binding 
budget reserve fund that allows for future legislation “related to any subsidies or funding 
advantage relative to other competitors received by bank holding companies with over $500 
billion in total assets.... ” 
S. 2270, as passed the Senate on June 5, 2014, would allow regulators to exempt insurers from 
the “Collins Amendment” to the Dodd-Frank Act131—bank capital requirements that would 
otherwise apply because the insurers are bank holding companies or have been designated as 
systemically important. It also exempts such insurers from preparing financial statements 
according to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Title I of H.R. 5461, which 
passed the House on September 16, 2014, contains the same language as S. 2270. It also includes 
three unrelated titles. 
H.R. 4881, as ordered to be reported by the House Financial Services Committee on June 20, 
2014, would place a one-year moratorium on FSOC designations of non-bank SIFIs upon 
enactment. 
H.R. 5016, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, contained a 
provision introduced by H.Amdt. 1096 that  
None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to (1) designate any nonbank 
financial company as “too big to fail”; (2) designate any nonbank financial company as a 
“systemically important financial institution”; or (3) make a determination that material 
financial distress at a nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of such company, could pose a 
threat to the financial stability of the United States. 
It passed the House on July 16, 2014. 
S. 798, the Terminating Bailouts for Taxpayer Fairness Act, would require a leverage ratio of at 
least 8% “equity capital” to “consolidated assets” for any bank or bank holding company with at 
least $50 billion of consolidated assets and a capital surcharge of at least 15% for any bank or 
bank holding company with at least $500 billion of consolidated assets. For other banks, it calls 
for leverage ratios comparable to leverage ratios in place as of May 1, 2013.132 The leverage ratio 
                                                 
130 Christopher Payne and Tony Costello, “Will Orderly Resolution Work?,” BGOV Analysis, May 19, 2014. 
131 For background on the Collins Amendment, see the section above entitled “Regulating TBTF.” 
132 The current Tier 1 leverage ratio is 4%. The bill provides a definition of equity and assets that make the quantitative 
ratios under the bill not directly comparable to ratios under current law, however. 
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for banks with at least $50 billion in assets and capital surcharge for banks with at least $500 
billion in assets would apply to non-bank affiliates and subsidiaries, with the exception of 
subsidiaries or affiliates that are functionally regulated by the SEC or state insurance regulators. 
The bill would prevent “further implementation” of the Basel III agreement, which modifies 
safety and soundness regulation of small and large banks. The new capital requirements would 
supersede the ratios used under existing capital requirements that determine whether a bank is 
well-capitalized and the enhanced capital requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act for BHCs with at 
least $50 billion in assets and non-banks designated as systemically important (SIFIs). The bill 
allows, but does not require, regulators to establish risk-based capital requirements for financial 
institutions with at least $20 billion in assets if the regulators unanimously agree that the bill’s 
other provisions are insufficient to prevent excessive risk concentration. The bill bans financial 
assistance to non-bank firms, subsidiaries, and affiliates from the federal government, Treasury’s 
Exchange Stabilization Fund, the FDIC, or the Fed (through its discount window or Section 13(3) 
emergency powers). It also strikes from Section 806 of the Dodd-Frank Act access for financial 
market utilities (FMUs) to Federal Reserve account services, borrowing privileges, and interest 
payments. It also strikes the FDIC’s systemic risk exception to least cost resolution under its bank 
resolution powers. The bill would modify the Federal Reserve’s Small Bank Holding Company 
Policy Statement, which permits bank holding companies with consolidated assets of $500 
million or less to acquire debt levels higher than permitted larger bank holding companies, by 
making the policy applicable to companies with assets of $5 billion or less. Under Dodd-Frank, 
bank holding companies subject to the Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement are 
exempt from Basel III. The bill has other provisions, including exemptions from certain 
regulations for small or rural banks. 
H.R. 3711/S. 1282, the 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act, would separate depository institutions 
from insurance companies, security entities, swap entities, and investment advisors. This legal 
separation includes banks affiliating with, owning, or having board members from such 
companies; operating in the same financial holding company; and holding an interest in a 
financial subsidiary. It would prohibit depository institutions from engaging in insurance 
activities, securities activities (including underwriting; market making; acting as a broker-dealer, 
futures commission merchant, investment adviser, or investment company; and making 
investments in hedge funds or private equity funds), swap activities (including acting as a swap 
dealer and major swap participant), agency transactional services, management consulting and 
counseling activities, proprietary trading, or prime brokerage activities. It would require banks to 
terminate non-bank affiliations, financial holding companies, and financial subsidiaries within 
five years, although federal bank regulators could require early termination or six-month 
extensions under certain circumstances. It would allow depository institutions to purchase 
securities on behalf of customers and for their own accounts, subject to restrictions. It would 
allow depository institutions to purchase swaps only to hedge a documented activity against 
specified risks. It would prohibit federal savings associations from investing in investment 
companies. The bill would also repeal provisions of the bankruptcy code that allow for qualified 
financial contracts, including repos, swaps, and master netting agreements, to avoid a stay or be 
liquidated, terminated, or accelerated. 
S. 100, the Terminating the Expansion of Too Big to Fail Act, would repeal the provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act granting FSOC authority to designate non-bank SIFIs and Fed authority to 
subject them to enhanced prudential regulation, and all references to non-bank SIFIs in the Dodd-
Frank Act. It would also repeal Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides for enhanced 
prudential supervision of payment, clearing, and settlement systems designated by FSOC as 
systemically important (“financial market utilities”). It has been referred to committee. 
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H.R. 1450/S. 685, Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Exist Act, would require the Secretary of the 
Treasury to produce a list of financial firms it believes are too big to fail, and break up those firms 
“so that their failure would no longer cause a catastrophic effect on the United States.... ” It has 
been referred to committee. 
H.R. 129/S. 985 Return to Prudent Banking Act, would prohibit affiliations between depositories 
and investment banks or securities firms. It has been referred to committee. 
H.R. 613, Systemic Risk Mitigation Act, would require BHCs with at least $50 billion in assets to 
issue long-term subordinated debt equal to at least 15% of the bank’s assets. If the average daily 
closing price of a credit default swap using the subordinated debt as a reference entity exceeds 0.5 
percentage points, the Fed would require the BHC to increase its Tier 1 capital. If the closing 
price exceeds 0.75 percentage points, the Fed may suspend the BHC’s dividend payments. If the 
closing price exceeds 1 percentage point, the company would be placed into receivership under 
the Orderly Liquidation Authority. The bill repeals the Fed’s authority to implement enhanced 
prudential regulation of banks with $50 billion or more in assets and non-bank SIFIs designated 
by FSOC. It also repeals the Volcker Rule ban on proprietary trading and hedge fund sponsorship. 
The bill was referred to committee. 
H.R. 2266, Subsidy Reserve Act, would require the Fed to estimate the implicit subsidy enjoyed 
by BHCs with more than $500 billion in assets and non-banks designated as SIFIs by the FSOC, 
and would require those firms to set aside that amount in a “subsidy reserve” account. 
H.R. 4060, Systemic Risk Designation Improvement Act, would require FSOC to designate 
BHCs as SIFIs through the same process used to designate non-banks as SIFIs beginning one 
year after enactment. It would prohibit FSOC from designating any BHC with less than $50 
billion in assets. It would repeal the section of the Dodd-Frank Act that subjects all BHCs with 
more than $50 billion in assets to enhanced supervision. H.R. 3036 is a similar bill. 
H.R. 4532 would change the mandatory threshold for enhanced Fed supervision for banks from 
$50 billion to $250 billion in assets. For banks with total assets between $50 billion and $250 
billion, FSOC would be required to determine that the bank posed systemic risk in order for the 
bank to be subject to enhanced supervision. Other provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act applying to 
banks with more than $50 billion in assets are also modified to apply only to banks that are 
subject to enhanced supervision. 
Representative Dave Camp’s Tax Reform Act of 2014 discussion draft includes an excise tax of 
0.035% on bank and non-bank SIFIs levied on the SIFI’s total consolidated assets (as reported to 
the Federal Reserve) in excess of $500 billion.133 
Conclusion 
Contagion stemming from problems at TBTF (or too interconnected to fail) firms is widely 
regarded to have been one of the primary sources of systemic risk during the recent financial 
crisis. To avoid contagion, a series of ad hoc government interventions were undertaken that 
                                                 
133 The discussion draft is posted here: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_draft__022614.pdf. 
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protected creditors and counterparties—in a few cases, also managers and shareholders—of large 
and interconnected firms from losses. Economic theory suggests that these interventions 
exacerbated the moral hazard implications of TBTF, reducing the incentive for creditors and 
counterparties to safeguard against extreme outcomes, and increased the incentive to become 
larger and more interconnected going forward. Competing theories blame the lack of regulatory 
authority and failed regulation for the role of TBTF in the recent crisis. The failures of both 
highly regulated banks and lightly regulated non-banks suggest that neither lack of regulation nor 
failed regulation were solely responsible for TBTF.  
Policy before the financial crisis could be characterized as an implicit market discipline approach 
with ambiguity about which firms policy makers considered to be TBTF and how the imminent 
failure of a systemically important firm might be addressed. This ambiguity was defended on the 
grounds that it would result in less moral hazard than if TBTF firms were explicitly identified, 
since the ambiguity would promote market discipline. As the crisis unfolded, policy quickly 
shifted to an implicit government assistance approach where Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and AIG received direct government support and several emergency programs were 
instituted to ensure that other financial firms remained liquid and solvent. Not every large failing 
firm received assistance, however, with Lehman Brothers being the notable exception. Both 
before and during the crisis, policy could be characterized as ad hoc because arguably no general 
approach or principles were articulated that clearly signaled to firms or investors how a 
systemically important firm could expect to be treated in different scenarios. Some believe that 
this policy uncertainty made the crisis worse. 
The rapid shift from market discipline to government assistance during the crisis undermines the 
future credibility of the pre-crisis policy approach. If policy makers wanted to return to a market 
discipline approach, making that approach effective would arguably require statutory changes that 
bolster policy makers’ credibility by “tying their hands” to make assistance more difficult in the 
event of a future TBTF failure. This could be accomplished by eliminating broad, open-ended 
authority that was invoked during the last crisis, such as Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
and the FDIC’s systemic risk exception to least cost resolution. Policy makers cannot be 
prevented from enacting future legislation allowing assistance, however, much as TARP was 
enacted expeditiously when the crisis worsened in September 2008. If investors do not believe 
that market discipline will be maintained because policy makers face short-term incentives to 
provide government assistance in times of crisis, then a “no bailouts” promise would not prevent 
moral hazard. 
One view is that the genie cannot be put back in the bottle—market participants now believe that 
the government will provide assistance to TBTF firms based on the 2008 experience, in which 
case they face little incentive to monitor or respond to excessive risk taking. If so, the policy 
options to mitigate moral hazard are to regulate TBTF firms or use government policy to reduce 
the systemic risk posed by TBTF firms.  
In theory, a special regulatory regime for TBTF firms could set safety and soundness standards at 
a strict enough level to neutralize moral hazard effects. The complexity and interconnectedness of 
large firms complicates their effective regulation, however. Moreover, a special regulatory regime 
for TBTF firms could backfire if regulatory capture occurs. Special regulation makes explicit 
which firms are TBTF, removing any ambiguity that might promote market discipline. As market 
discipline wanes, the burden on regulators to mitigate moral hazard increases. If regulators are 
unwilling or unable to apply regulatory standards that negate the benefits of being TBTF, then 
being subject to the special regulatory regime could give TBTF firms a competitive advantage 
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over their industry rivals. The experience of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac points to the dangers of 
this approach. Those two firms were subject to their own regulatory regime prior to the crisis and 
were able to borrow at lower interest rates than other financial firms, presumably because of the 
implicit government guarantee of their obligations. 
Systemic risk stemming from TBTF can also be mitigated by reducing potential spillover and 
contagion effects. Examples of proposals to reduce contagion effects include a special resolution 
regime for failing systemically important firms and placing limits on counterparty exposure to 
large firms. Events in 2008, however, demonstrate the challenge in eliminating systemic risk 
posed by TBTF firms because it is unlikely that policy makers will correctly anticipate all of the 
channels of contagion in a crisis. Moreover, in determining whether to use government resources 
to limit losses to creditors, the receiver faces the same short-term incentives to spare creditors 
from losses that lead to moral hazard. Critics point to the open-ended assistance to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac since 2008 as a cautionary tale, although this was through government 
conservatorship, rather than receivership. 
Some argue for eliminating TBTF directly by reducing the size or scope of the largest firms. It is 
uncertain what size limit would eliminate TBTF—given that interconnectedness is a nebulous 
concept—and success can only be confirmed by observing what occurs after a firm fails. Weighed 
against the benefits of eliminating the TBTF problem, the benefits to the financial system that 
would be lost by eliminating large firms are also disputed. In the case of reducing scope, some 
large firms would remain, and they would be less diversified against risk. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are examples of large, narrowly focused firms that many nonetheless viewed as 
TBTF. 
A comprehensive policy is likely to incorporate more than one approach because different 
approaches are aimed at different parts of the problem. Some approaches focus on preventive 
measures (keeping TBTF firms out of trouble), whereas others are reactive (addressing what to do 
in the event of a TBTF failure). Some policy approaches are complementary—others could 
undermine each other. A market discipline approach is arguably most likely to succeed if coupled 
with size limits—although size limits thwart market-based profit incentives and outcomes. 
Policies that involve identification of TBTF firms, such as a special regulatory regime, are less 
compatible with a market discipline approach. Efforts to minimize spillover effects could be more 
effective if the TBTF firms are regulated for safety and soundness, so that spillover effects can 
more easily be identified ahead of time. Policy makers have historically coped with the moral 
hazard associated with deposit insurance through a combination of safety and soundness 
regulation, a resolution regime, and limits on spillover effects (e.g., limits on counterparty 
exposure). (Market discipline’s role is limited by deposit insurance, but it plays a role with 
uninsured depositors and other creditors.) Yet TBTF poses some additional challenges to the bank 
regulation model, such as the difficulties of imposing a strict least cost resolution requirement on 
a resolution regime and effectively regulating firms with complex and wide-ranging activities. 
Each of these policy approaches to coping with TBTF has strengths and weaknesses; there is no 
silver-bullet solution to the problem because future policy makers face incentives to deviate from 
the approach to avoid crises, please interest groups, increase financial innovation and the 
availability of credit, and so on. Judging the relative merits of each policy approach depends in 
part on which approach future policy makers can best commit to and effectively carry out.  
The Dodd-Frank Act devised a strategy to end TBTF that, to varying degrees, incorporated each 
approach discussed in this report. Ultimately, the only definitive test of whether the strategy 
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succeeds is whether the failure of a large firm can be managed without a “bailout” and whether 
large firms stay healthy in a financial downturn—events that may not occur for years or even 
decades. Until then, perceptions of whether the TBTF problem still exists may develop (and be 
observable in market data), which could subsequently be proven true or false. 
Although TBTF was one cause of systemic risk in the recent crisis, it was not the only one. The 
Dodd-Frank Act also attempted to address other sources of systemic risk. Although the broader 
issue of systemic risk is beyond the scope of this report, some policy options discussed in this 
report may be more effective at mitigating systemic risk if applied more broadly than to TBTF 
firms exclusively. Otherwise, some sources of systemic risk may migrate to firms not regulated 
for safety and soundness, without increasing the stability of the overall financial system. If 
systemic risk mainly stems from certain activities, regardless of size, a policy focus on large 
institutions could risk creating a false sense of security. 
Risk is central to financial activity, so an optimal system is probably not one where large firms 
never fail. An optimal system is one in which a large firm can fail without destabilizing the 
financial system. The only system that can guarantee that large firms will not cause systemic risk 
is one without large firms, but a system without large firms may be less efficient. Other 
approaches seek to limit systemic risk to acceptable levels. Creating a more stable financial 
system by mitigating the moral hazard associated with TBTF may result in credit becoming more 
expensive and less available in the short run, but the availability of credit could be less volatile 
over time. Some policy makers would consider a tradeoff of less credit for a more stable financial 
system to be a tradeoff worth taking, considering that the recent crisis resulted in the deepest and 
longest recession since the Great Depression. Arguably, part of the cause of the crisis was that 
credit became too readily available, at least in some sectors (e.g., the housing bubble). At least 
partly offsetting the higher costs of capital for firms designated as systemically important would 
be relatively lower costs of capital for other firms. 
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Appendix. Selected Historical Experiences With 
“Too Big To Fail” 
Before the Recent Crisis 
There have always been large financial firms in the United States, but concentration within the 
banking sector and non-bank financial sector has increased in recent decades. This growth is a 
reflection of both policy changes that made growth easier and market changes that made growth 
more profitable. For example, technological change altered the types of financial products that 
could be offered and the relative costs of offering them, and investments in information 
technology may be subject to economies of scale. 
Two important policy changes that allowed financial firms to become larger since the Great 
Depression were the erosion of the separation of banking from other financial services (such as 
investment banking) and the erosion of prohibitions on interstate banking.  
The Glass-Steagall Act forbade commercial banks from underwriting or trading in certain types 
of securities and affiliating with a business engaged principally in investment banking. It forbade 
investment banks from accepting deposits and forbade the same company from owning a 
commercial bank and an investment bank. The Bank Holding Company Act prohibited banks 
from affiliating with companies engaging in insurance underwriting and defined the activities 
closely related to banking that banks were allowed to engage in.134 Implementation of these 
restrictions relied upon regulators’ judgment and interpretation, which evolved over time. 
Regulators interpreted which securities commercial banks were eligible to purchase, which 
activities fell within the “business of banking,” and how closely affiliated commercial banks 
could be with investment banks. From the 1970s on, regulators began to interpret Glass-Steagall 
more loosely, and differences between commercial banks and investment banks began to erode.135  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 repealed the prohibition on affiliations between 
commercial banks and investment banks or insurance companies, and created a financial holding 
company (FHC) structure to facilitate those affiliations. Within a FHC or BHC, firewalls are 
required to prevent financial problems at non-depository subsidiary from affecting a depository 
subsidiary. (GLBA kept intact the provisions of Glass-Steagall preventing investment banks from 
accepting deposits.) While GLBA made it easier for firms in diverse lines of business to operate 
under a holding company structure, it also formalized Federal Reserve supervision and regulation 
of complex financial firms. GLBA formalized the Fed’s role as “umbrella regulator” of bank 
holding companies and financial holding companies and the Office of Thrift Supervision as 
umbrella regulator of thrift holding companies, and allowed the regulators to set consolidated 
capital standards at the holding company level. The Fed’s role as umbrella regulator gave it very 
limited powers, however, to regulate or examine subsidiaries that already had a functional 
regulator, such as investment firms and insurers.136  
                                                 
134 70 Stat. 133. 
135 For more information on the erosion of Glass Steagall, see CRS Report R41181, Permissible Securities Activities of 
Commercial Banks Under the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), by David H. 
Carpenter and M. Maureen Murphy. 
136 For more information, see Mark Greenlee, “Historical Review of ‘Umbrella Regulation’ by the Board of Governors 
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Traditionally, banks were chartered to operate in one state. Interstate banking by national banks 
was allowed with a state’s consent under the McFadden Act of 1927 (P.L. 69-639). The absence 
of state consent prevented widespread interstate banking for the next several decades, curbing the 
growth in nationwide banks. A series of legislative and regulatory changes led to the spread of 
interstate banking in the 1980s and 1990s. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching 
Efficiency Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-328) further liberalized interstate banking.137 The Riegle-Neal 
Act prevented mergers resulting in a BHC exceeding 10% of national deposits and 30% of a 
state’s deposits. 
The history of government bailouts on TBTF grounds before 2008 is largely limited to the cases 
of a few banks. In cases where government intervention to prevent the failure of non-banks on 
TBTF grounds was urged (Long-Term Capital Management), the government ultimately decided 
not to intervene financially to save the companies, and the spillover effects were limited. The 
Appendix does not review cases where federal assistance was provided on other than systemic 
risk grounds. Most of the economic arguments of how financial firms are prone to contagion and 
runs do not apply to non-financial firms. Examples include assistance to non-financial firms such 
as Lockheed in 1970, Chrysler in 1980, and Chrysler and GM in 2008, where assistance was 
justified on the grounds of avoiding negative effects on the region or industry.138  
Resolution of Banks Before and After the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act 
Currently, the two main methods for resolving failed banks are “depositor payoff” (winding down 
the bank and paying off depositors) and “purchase and assumption” (selling parts of failed banks, 
such as deposits and sound assets, to healthy banks).139 In either method, uninsured depositors 
and creditors are compensated according to the priority of their claims to the extent that the 
proceeds of the sale or liquidation allow; only insured depositors are guaranteed to be fully 
compensated. In practice, it was standard for the acquiring bank to take on the accounts of the 
uninsured depositors in the case of a purchase and assumption, resulting in no losses for the 
latter.140 According to Stern and Feldman, “Reliance on [purchase and assumption] led the deposit 
insurer to cover all depositors. The FDIC covered more than 99 percent of uninsured depositors 
from 1985 to 1991, a period in which roughly 1,200 commercial banks failed.”141 
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of the Federal Reserve System,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, working paper 08-07, October 2008. 
137 For more information, see CRS Report 94-744, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994, by M. Maureen Murphy. (This report is out of print, but available by request.) 
138 See General Accounting Office, Guidelines for Rescuing Large Failing Firms and Municipalities, GAO Report 
GGD-84-34, March 29, 1984; CRS Report R41401, General Motors’ Initial Public Offering: Review of Issues and 
Implications for TARP, by Bill Canis, Baird Webel, and Gary Shorter; CRS Report R41940, TARP Assistance for 
Chrysler: Restructuring and Repayment Issues, by Baird Webel and Bill Canis. 
139 For more information on the resolution process, see CRS Report RL34657, Financial Institution Insolvency: 
Federal Authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Depository Institutions, by David H. Carpenter and M. Maureen 
Murphy. 
140 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Managing The Crisis, Part 1, Chapter 3, August 1998, http://www.fdic.gov/
bank/historical/managing/history1-03.pdf.  
141 Gary Stern and Ron Feldman, Too Big to Fail, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), 2004, p. 151. 
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In the past, an alternative option for resolving troubled banks was open bank assistance. Under 
open bank assistance, the FDIC could make loans to banks that could no longer obtain funding 
from the private sector in order to keep banks operating as an ongoing concern as an alternative to 
resolving them. Banks receiving open bank assistance were often required by the FDIC to replace 
management and dilute shareholders, but creditors and depositors would be unaffected. In 1950, 
Congress granted the FDIC the ability to give open bank assistance to troubled banks if the bank’s 
“continued existence was determined to be ‘essential’ to providing adequate banking services in 
the community,” leaving the determination of “essential” to the FDIC.142 “Essentiality” was 
invoked 10 times between 1971 and 1991, the largest example of which was for Continental 
Illinois, which is discussed below in detail.143 In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Act broadened the 
FDIC’s ability to provide open bank assistance to include cases where the FDIC determined that 
it would cost less than liquidation.  
Open bank assistance was not used until the 1970s, and was not used frequently until the Savings 
and Loan Crisis in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1992, it was used for 133 banks, which were 
larger on average than banks resolved under the other methods. 70 of the 133 instances were for 
banks within two specific bank holding companies, BancTexas and First City Bancorporation of 
Texas. While these two were not among the largest banks in the country, the FDIC provided them 
with open bank assistance on the grounds that their failure would lead to contagion throughout 
Texas banks, which had been weakened by the energy bust.144  
Open bank assistance could be used because a bank was deemed TBTF, but it could also be used 
for other reasons, including regional difficulties, which were more acute before interstate 
banking. Some of the banks to which it was applied were large by state standards, but were not 
particularly large at a national level (which few banks were, at the time). Furthermore, prior to 
various legislation in the 1980s, the purchase and assumption method was relatively more costly 
and often resulted in litigation, making open bank assistance relatively more attractive from 
regulators’ perspective. Thus, it is difficult to establish how many of these 133 cases were 
motivated by TBTF concerns, or how much this experience had led banks, creditors, and 
counterparties to conclude that large banks would not be allowed to fail.  
Regulators could also avoid resolving a bank through regulatory forbearance. An example of 
regulatory forbearance is allowing banks to temporarily operate with capital below required 
levels. Regulators could choose to allow regulatory forbearance on TBTF grounds, although in 
practice, it often occurred with small thrifts in the 1980s.145 
Many economists criticized the handling of bank resolutions in the 1980s, arguing that regulatory 
forbearance worsened the moral hazard problem, because a troubled bank allowed to remain in 
operation had even more incentive to take risks. Legislation in 1991 reduced the potential for 
regulatory forbearance by requiring prompt corrective action and least cost resolution of troubled 
                                                 
142 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Managing The Crisis, Part 1, Chapter 5, August 1998, p. 153, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-05.pdf.  
143 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Continental Illinois and ‘Too Big to Fail’,” History of the Eighties, Ch. 7, 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/235_258.pdf. 
144 Besides FDIC resolutions, there were a large number of thrift resolutions in the 1980s. Since these institutions 
tended to be small, this experience is not central to the TBTF issue. 
145 FDIC, “The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking,” History of the Eighties – Lessons for the 
Future, December 1997, Ch. 4, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/. 
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banks.146 These legislative changes and others made open bank assistance less likely, and 
according to FDIC data, open bank assistance was not used between 1993 and 2008.147 (Purchase 
and assumption continued to be the main method of resolution after 1991, but bids involving only 
insured deposits became more common.) Current law, as amended by the 1991 legislation, allows 
the FDIC to waive the least cost resolution method if the Treasury Secretary (in consultation with 
the President, Federal Reserve, and FDIC) believes that least cost resolution would cause 
systemic risk, however.148 TBTF is potential grounds for invoking this systemic risk exception. 
Thus, while the 1991 legislation is perceived to have reduced moral hazard at small banks, it is 
not clear whether it had a significant effect on the TBTF problem.  
Penn Central Railroad 
After unsuccessfully seeking financial assistance from Congress and the Fed, Penn Central 
Railroad filed for bankruptcy in June 1970. At that time, it had $82 million in commercial paper 
outstanding, and when it filed for bankruptcy, the Fed feared its bankruptcy would cause 
disruption in the commercial paper market for all borrowers. The Fed temporarily removed legal 
interest rate ceilings to avoid a credit crunch and “made clear that the Federal Reserve discount 
window would be available to assist banks in meeting the needs of businesses unable to roll over 
maturing commercial paper.”149 In other words, the Fed was willing to assist the counterparties to 
prevent contagion from a perceived TBTF failure, rather than preventing the firm from failing. In 
any case, the perceived contagion from that source did not materialize—data do not indicate an 
unusual amount of discount window lending by the Fed in 1970.150 
Beginning in 1974, the federal government provided financial assistance to maintain the viability 
of passenger rail service in the wake of Penn Central’s bankruptcy. This assistance was not 
provided to prevent bankruptcy or to maintain financial stability, and is therefore beyond the 
scope of this report. 
Franklin National 
Franklin National, the nation’s 20th-largest bank, experienced financial difficulties in 1974. 
Fearing that its failure would destabilize money markets, the Fed purchased its foreign exchange 
balances and futures contracts and provided it loans through the discount window to keep it 
afloat. When Franklin was resolved later that year, the FDIC assumed Franklin’s $1.7 billion 
unpaid discount window loan.151 
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Continental Illinois 
Continental Illinois was the nation’s seventh-largest bank in 1984.152 Continental Illinois losses 
have been tied to its aggressive growth in commercial lending beginning in the late 1970s.153 
Continental Illinois’ problems began in 1982 with the failure of a correspondent bank, and came 
to a head in 1984 with a run by some uninsured depositors. Despite being subject to the FDIC’s 
resolution regime, the Comptroller of the Currency at the time testified that Continental Illinois 
could not be allowed to fail because it would have caused the failure of more than 100 banks with 
deposits at Continental Illinois, and dozens of corporate customers.154 It began receiving federal 
assistance in 1984 in the form of discount window loans from the Fed that peaked at $8 billion 
and a guarantee by the FDIC of all uninsured depositors and creditors. Eventually, policy makers 
decided a more permanent solution was needed. Instead of taking Continental Illinois into 
receivership, the FDIC purchased $3.5 billion of problem loans and $1 billion of preferred shares, 
and repaid $3.5 billion in loans from the Federal Reserve. The final cost to FDIC was $1.1 
billion.155 The chairman of the board and chief executive officer were replaced, and the FDIC 
received an option to acquire Continental Illinois’ stock to cover potential losses.  
Continental Illinois was regulated for safety and soundness, operating in an era before many 
financial regulations were liberalized by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and other legislative and 
regulatory changes.156 One problem identified was the pace with which regulators addressed 
Continental’s problems—the bank failed in September; the previous May, OCC had stated that 
the bank’s capital ratios “compared favorably to those of other multinational banks.”157 Had 
regulators addressed Continental Illinois’ financial problems sooner, the ultimate cost to taxpayers 
may have been lower. Continental Illinois also led to a more explicit TBTF policy, at least for 
banks. At a congressional hearing, Comptroller of the Currency Todd Conover testified that “the 
federal government won’t currently allow any of the nation’s 11 largest banks to fail,” but did not 
name those banks.158 One study found that after this testimony, the 11 largest banks received 
higher ratings on their bonds and borrowed at lower costs.159  
Long-Term Capital Management 
In 1998, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) experienced a liquidity crisis 
as a result of large leveraged trading losses resulting from an unanticipated widening of credit 
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spreads. To avoid a failure that the Fed thought could be destabilizing to the financial system as a 
whole, the New York Fed organized a group of large financial institutions to offer LTCM private 
assistance in the form of a $3.6 billion capital injection, without the use of any public funds or 
guarantees. The Fed was concerned that liquidating LTCM’s large trading positions could 
destabilize financial markets and impose large losses on counterparties. In the weeks before the 
capital injection, LTCM’s capital had been rapidly depleted by losses, but its net asset value was 
still positive, albeit small, at the time of the intervention.160 The Fed’s actions in this case could be 
described as helping the rescuing firms (who were also LTCM counterparties) to overcome the 
collective action problem—the firms involved were better off recapitalizing the firm than 
liquidating it, but unless they could act collectively, it was in no firm’s individual interest to 
recapitalize it alone. Critics claimed the Fed’s intervention was unnecessary, as an alternative 
offer from another group of investors to purchase the firm on less attractive terms was also 
made.161  
As in 2007, overall markets came under unusual stress and became illiquid in 1998. Unlike 2007, 
the stress passed and markets recovered quickly in 1998. Although it is unknown what would 
have happened had LTCM been allowed to fail, this experience seemed at the time to provide a 
framework for coping with problems at a TBTF firm—preventing LTCM’s failure prevented 
contagion from spreading to other institutions or markets, and conditions were able to quickly 
normalize. Since the government did not offer financial assistance, it could continue to claim that 
TBTF firms would not be bailed out. LTCM’s problems did not cause investors to doubt the 
health of similar firms, as happened in the recent crisis. A lesson that many drew from this 
episode was that market mechanisms and existing policy tools could contain the contagion effects 
resulting from liquidity problems at a highly leveraged and interconnected firm that was not 
regulated for safety and soundness. 
Firms in 2008 
Several large firms experienced difficulty in 2008, and these problems were resolved in a number 
of ways. Bear Stearns and AIG were rescued from failure through government assistance. 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered government 
conservatorship. Wachovia and Washington Mutual were acquired by other banks without 
government assistance. 
As the name implies, “too big to fail” requires both size and the prospect of failure. Part of the 
reason the policy issue came to the forefront in 2008 and not earlier is because the crisis led to so 
many failures of large and small firms. The probability of a large (or small) firm failing in 2008 
was much higher than in the decades of financial stability leading up to 2008. More contentious is 
the argument made by some that the probability of failure was also higher in 2008 because large 
firms were taking greater risks than in previous decades. Evidence presented in support of this 
argument includes the rise over time in financial firms’ use of leverage (debt-to-equity ratios),162 
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unstable sources of liquidity, and complex financial instruments such as credit default swaps 
(which could be used by a firm to reduce or increase certain forms of risk). 
Bear Stearns 
In the recent crisis, the investment bank Bear Stearns was the first TBTF firm to receive 
government assistance to avert failure.163 Bear Stearns was not a bank holding company regulated 
for safety and soundness, nor subject to the FDIC’s resolution regime.164 It came under severe 
liquidity pressures in early March 2008, when creditors refused to roll over short-term debt and 
counterparties withdrew funds, in what observers have coined a non-bank run. An SEC press 
release a few days before its takeover indicated that Bear Stearns had $17 billion of cash and 
other liquid assets—an amount that was quickly depleted by the run.165 The run was set off by 
concerns that Bear Stearns held a large portfolio of illiquid, “troubled” assets that investors 
believed would continue losing value in the future and deplete its remaining capital. 
By the weekend of March 15, it had become clear that Bear Stearns could not survive the run by 
creditors. Although Bear Stearns was not indisputably “too big to fail” (it was the 138th-largest 
firm by revenues in 2007 on Fortune Magazine’s Fortune 500 list),166 some policy makers argued 
for government intervention on the grounds that Bear Stearns was “too interconnected to fail,” 
meaning too many counterparties and markets would be disrupted by a traditional bankruptcy 
filing.167 The Fed sought a healthy firm to acquire Bear Stearns, but was unable to find a willing 
partner without financial assistance. Over the weekend of March 15, the Fed arranged and 
assisted in the takeover of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase at a very low purchase price 
(originally $2 per share, subsequently increased to $10 per share), which Bear Stearns’ board of 
directors agreed to accept instead of pursuing a bankruptcy filing. The takeover led to 
replacement of some of Bear Stearns’ management and the low share price meant that 
shareholders were effectively diluted, although they likely fared better than they would have in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. J.P. Morgan Chase agreed to honor all of Bear Stearns’ contractual 
obligations, however, which meant that creditors and counterparties were fully compensated, 
creating moral hazard problems.  
The main stumbling block for J.P. Morgan Chase was Bear Stearns’ large portfolio of troubled 
assets. As part of the agreement, the Fed agreed to purchase up to $30 billion of Bear Stearns’ 
assets through Maiden Lane I, a new Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) based in Delaware that 
it created and controlled. J.P. Morgan Chase would bear up to $1.15 billion in future first losses, 
based on assets valued at $29.97 billion at marked-to-market prices by Bear Stearns on March 14, 
2008.168 About half of these assets were collateralized mortgage obligations. The Fed has 
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gradually sold off the assets, in order “to minimize disruption to financial markets and maximize 
recovery value.”169 This transaction exposed the Fed to significant credit risk on its balance sheet 
for the first time in decades. By 2012, Maiden Lane had received more from asset sales than the 
Fed had contributed to their purchases. Principal and interest were recouped, and some assets 
remained that could provide the Fed with additional future profits when sold. CBO estimated at 
the time of inception that the Maiden Lane transaction was not subsidized since the assets were 
bought at market prices.170 In addition, during the JP Morgan Chase takeover, Bear Stearns had an 
average of $13.9 billion loans outstanding from the Primary Dealer Credit Facility from March 17 
to June 23, 2008, and $1.5 billion loans outstanding from the Term Securities Lending Facility 
from March 28 to May 9, 2008.171 These facilities were broadly based emergency Fed programs 
created during the crisis. These loans were repaid in full with interest. 
Had Bear Stearns been a bank holding company, it might have been able to boost its liquidity 
with collateralized loans from the Fed. It also would have been subject to prudential regulation by 
the Fed that might have required it to pursue a more conservative business strategy. Since it was 
not a bank holding company, the Fed relied on emergency lending powers not used to lend to 
non-banks since the Great Depression. Since these powers limited the Fed to lending, the Fed was 
required to set up the LLC structure to make the asset purchases possible.  
Although Bear Stearns’ liquidity problems were driving it into bankruptcy had the government 
not interceded, it is unclear whether it was insolvent. Before that weekend, Bear Stearns was not 
insolvent by two common measurements: its stock price (representing the current market 
valuation of the firm’s net worth) was still $30 per share, and its primary regulator, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), issued a press release on March 11 that stated that Bear 
Stearns was adequately capitalized according to its net capital rule.172 Even after the crisis, 
existing shares were valued positively in the J.P. Morgan Chase takeover, and no capital was 
provided to Bear Stearns as part of the Fed’s assistance (since the assets bought by Maiden Lane 
were purchased at market value, according to the Fed). On the other hand, J.P. Morgan stated that 
the equity in Bear Stearns was exhausted and J.P. Morgan Chase took additional losses from costs 
associated with the Bear Stearns acquisition.173 
Unlike the LTCM experience, the rescue of Bear Stearns arguably did not cause investors to 
conclude that Bear Stearns was an isolated “bad apple.” Instead, speculation persisted over the 
next few months that other investment banks would suffer the same fate—speculation that came 
to a head with the wave of financial firm failures in September 2008. 
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Ban on Naked Short Selling in July 2008 
As financial turmoil worsened in the summer of 2008, the stock value of many large financial 
firms fell quickly. The SEC responded on July 15, 2008, by announcing that investors would no 
longer be able to “naked short sell” the stocks of 19 large financial firms, an investment strategy 
that would pay off if the firms’ stock price fell further.174 The firms chosen were Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the primary dealers (large financial firms that conduct open market operations 
with the Federal Reserve).175 Some market participants perceived this announcement as an 
explicit list of the firms that the government considered too big to fail. If this announcement was 
intended to rescue troubled firms, either by making short selling more difficult or by making too 
big to fail status more explicit, it did not work in all cases—in September 2008, Lehman Brothers 
entered bankruptcy, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered government conservatorship. Nor 
did the list closely correspond to which firms would or would not receive government assistance 
subsequently—American International Group (AIG) received assistance although it was not one 
of the 19 firms listed, while Lehman Brothers did not receive although it was included on the list. 
The July ban was superseded by an SEC rule issued on September 18, 2008, that temporarily 
banned all short-selling of the stocks of 700 financial firms and an October 1, 2008, rule that 
imposed a permanent ban on naked short-selling. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Not only were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac very large, their TBTF status was also influenced by 
their unusual status as government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Because of unusual features 
such as their congressional charter, line of credit with the Treasury, dominance of the home 
mortgage secondary market, and original status as government agencies, investors perceived them 
as more likely to be backed by the government than other firms, although their securities had no 
explicit government guarantee. This perception allowed them to consistently borrow at a lower 
cost than other financial firms, despite holding relatively little capital. Before conservatorship, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the only firms regulated by their federal regulator, whose 
independence and powers were limited compared to other regulators.176 These institutional 
features led critics to argue that the GSEs enjoyed the benefits of “regulatory capture.” Their 
regulator found them to meet the statutory definition of well capitalized as recently as July 
2008.177 
Holding mainly mortgage-backed securities and mortgages in their portfolios, they were uniquely 
vulnerable to the decline in the housing market and MBS prices. In July 2008, investor concern 
about persistent losses and the potential for future losses led to a sharp decline in stock prices and 
cast doubt on their ability to roll over maturing debt. Treasury Secretary Paulson argued that the 
solution to this problem was for Congress to grant him what he referred to as a “bazooka”—the 
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authority for Treasury to provide the GSEs with unlimited funding. He argued that the bazooka 
would calm investor fears, and as a result would not need to be used. Congress provided this 
authority in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 110-289). 
By September 2008, the government decided to take the GSEs into conservatorship following 
further losses.178 Conservatorship means that the government has assumed the normal powers of 
the officers, board of directors, and shareholders, but the GSEs would continue business 
operations. In addition, the government would purchase their MBS and inject as much capital as 
needed to keep the firms solvent. In return, the government received warrants to purchase 79.9% 
of the companies’ common stock, which would dilute existing shareholders when exercised. 
Management was also replaced and dividends on preferred shares were eliminated, but creditors, 
including subordinated debt holders, and counterparties suffered no losses. 
One rationale for placing the GSEs in conservatorship was that their dominant role in mortgage-
backed securities markets could not have been replaced quickly by the private sector given the 
housing downturn. Without them, mortgage credit would have become less available, placing 
further downward pressure on the housing market. Another rationale was the potential for 
contagion to counterparties and creditors given the large amount of GSE debt and GSE-
guaranteed MBS outstanding. 
To bridge the gap between the companies’ assets and liabilities, the government provided $187.5 
billion to the companies in exchange for preferred shares between 2008 and 2012. The 
government received $55 billion of dividends on those shares through 2012. Since then, the 
GSEs’ assets have matched their liabilities and no further preferred share issuance has been 
needed. Under the existing agreement, the GSEs’ profits (after dividend payments) would have 
accumulated in their coffers.179 Treasury announced in August 2012 that, “(a)cting upon the 
commitment ... that the GSEs will be wound down and will not be allowed to retain profits, 
rebuild capital, and return to the market in their prior form,” the preferred share agreements had 
been amended to replace the dividend and commitment fee with a “net income sweep” that would 
remit all profits to the Treasury.180 Regardless of the amount remitted, the terms of the sweep do 
not allow for a reduction in the preferred shares outstanding. Thus, while Treasury has not 
recouped any principal, it earned a cumulative $202.8 billion in income through the first quarter 
of 2014—more than it outlayed.  
In economic terms, the subsidy to the GSEs, which takes into account future losses and the 
opportunity cost inherent in the GSEs’ ability to borrow at below market rates, was estimated by 
CBO to be $291 billion through 2009. Since this estimate was made in August 2009, the state of 
the housing market has improved considerably, which could reduce expected defaults and thus the 
size of the subsidy, were CBO to update its estimate. In addition, CBO assumes that the 
companies will continue to do business at below-market costs in the future that will lead to future 
subsidies from the government.181  
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Between December 2008 and March 2010, the Fed purchased $67 billion of debt issued by 
Freddie Mac and $67 billion issued by Fannie Mae as part of its “Large Scale Asset Purchases” 
(popularly known as quantitative easing). While the asset purchases were intended to provide 
support to mortgage markets and to stimulate overall economic conditions, another effect of these 
purchases was to reduce the GSEs’ borrowing costs, all else equal. As these assets have matured, 
the Fed’s holdings have declined over time. The Fed faces no default risk on its GSE holdings as 
long as the Treasury continues to stand behind the GSEs, and will not experience capital losses 
(or gains) as long as it continues to hold the securities to maturity. The Treasury and Fed have 
also purchased debt and MBS issued by the GSEs since 2008. The MBS purchases were made at 
market prices on the secondary market, so the purchases conferred no direct benefit to the GSEs, 
but had the effect of indirectly raising the price received by the GSEs for their MBS.  
Lehman Brothers 
Shortly after the failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the investment bank Lehman Brothers 
experienced a liquidity crisis. Lehman Brothers was the 47th-largest firm by revenues in 2007 on 
Fortune Magazine’s Fortune 500 list.182 Lehman Brothers was not a bank holding company 
regulated for safety and soundness, nor subject to the FDIC’s resolution regime. Lehman Brothers 
was a unitary thrift holding company under OTS umbrella supervision; OTS was focused mainly 
on the health of the depository subsidiaries. It also complied with an SEC net capital rule.183 
Policy makers decided to allow Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy when it became clear that 
no other firm was willing to acquire the firm without government assistance. According to 
Bankruptcydata.com, Lehman Brothers was the largest firm by assets ever to file for 
bankruptcy.184 
Lehman Brothers was larger than Bear Stearns and was involved in similar business lines. Bear 
Stearns had been saved with government assistance, and many market participants were surprised 
that a similar arrangement was not made for Lehman Brothers. Unlike Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers had access to Fed lending facilities (created after the Bear Stearns crisis), but did not 
have enough collateral under the terms of the Fed program to borrow enough to meet its liquidity 
needs at the time of its failure. (This problem did not arise when the Fed rescued AIG the next 
day.) Policy makers argued that markets should not have expected government assistance because 
they had stressed since the Bear Stearns intervention that similar assistance could not be expected 
in the future and that failures were necessary to prevent moral hazard problems. Policy makers 
also argued that Lehman Brothers had plenty of time to defend themselves from the fate suffered 
by Bear Stearns by raising more capital and long-term liquidity. (Lehman Brothers did raise some 
in the summer of 2008.) Policy makers believed that they and counterparties were now well 
enough prepared for a counterparty failure that systemic risk could be contained.185  
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Some point to the complex, lengthy nature of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy proceedings as 
evidence that Lehman Brothers was too big to fail, while others argue that bankruptcy 
proceedings have gone relatively smoothly and are successfully resolving the claims of creditors 
and counterparties in an orderly fashion.186 A New York Fed study finds that creditors received an 
unusually low recovery rate from the Lehman bankruptcy.187 
Where Lehman Brothers’ failure proved more disruptive to financial markets was through its 
effects on money market mutual funds (MMF) and the commercial paper market. On September 
16, 2008, a MMF called the Reserve Fund “broke the buck,” meaning that the value of its shares 
had fallen below face value. This occurred because of losses it had taken on short-term debt 
issued by Lehman Brothers, which filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. Money market 
investors had perceived “breaking the buck” to be highly unlikely, and its occurrence set off a run 
on money market funds, as investors simultaneously attempted to withdraw an estimated $250 
billion of their investments—even from funds without exposure to Lehman Brothers.188 MMFs 
are major investors in commercial paper, so this run greatly decreased the demand for new 
commercial paper.189 Firms rely on the ability to issue new debt to roll over maturing debt to meet 
their liquidity needs. A blanket federal guarantee of MMFs and three Federal Reserve commercial 
paper programs were created to restore calm to these markets.190  
Contagion from Lehman Brothers’ failure also spread to its three remaining independent “bulge 
bracket” investment bank rivals, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. All three 
experienced liquidity strains following Lehman Brothers’ failure, which all three survived, but 
only after fundamental changes to their business models. Merrill Lynch merged with Bank of 
America under financial strain, which would cause problems for Bank of America in the ensuing 
months. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley changed their charters to become bank holding 
companies, under the umbrella supervision of the Federal Reserve. All three relied heavily on 
broadly based federal facilities to weather the storm. Borrowing from the Fed’s Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility peaked at $48 billion for Morgan Stanley and $40 billion for Merrill Lynch on 
September 26, 2008, and at $17 billion for Goldman Sachs on October 10, 2008. All three firms 
also accessed the Fed’s Term Securities Lending Facility throughout the fall and its Commercial 
Paper Funding Facility beginning in late October. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs each 
received $10 billion in exchange for preferred shares through TARP’s Capital Purchase Program 
on October 28, 2008, and $10 billion of CPP funds for Merrill Lynch were received by Bank of 
America after their merger. 
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Although the Fed was not willing to rescue Lehman Brothers, it provided Lehman Brothers with 
liquidity for a short time to ease the bankruptcy process.191 Lehman Brothers borrowed an 
average of $23 billion each day from the Fed’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, a broadly based 
emergency facility, from September 15, the day it filed for bankruptcy, to September 17, 2008.192 
Lehman Brothers also borrowed from the Fed’s Term Securities Lending Facility frequently from 
March 2008 to September 12, 2008. 
AIG 
At the same time as the failure of Lehman Brothers, American International Group (AIG) ran into 
liquidity problems as a result of collateral calls on its credit default swaps and securities lending 
program.193  
AIG is a large financial firm operating domestically and abroad; at the time of the crisis, its 
insurance operations were the fifth largest in the world. While AIG is often thought of as an 
insurance company, it was a complex financial institution with many different types of 
subsidiaries, such as AIG Financial Products, which Fed Chairman Bernanke reportedly likened 
to a hedge fund.194 Its overall legal structure was a unitary thrift regulated by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), although its thrift operations were relatively small. AIG’s insurance 
subsidiaries were regulated at the state level. Losses were centered in the Financial Products 
subsidiary and its securities lending program; as its umbrella regulator, OTS was focused mainly 
on the health of the depository subsidiaries. OTS has testified that it did not fully foresee the 
potential losses that transactions undertaken by AIG Financial Products posed to the holding 
company.195 
Unlike Lehman Brothers, policy makers decided that the systemic risk implications of an AIG 
failure were too great. AIG was listed as the 10th-largest firm by revenues in 2007 on Fortune 
Magazine’s Fortune 500 list.196 On September 16, 2008, the Fed announced that it was taking 
action to support AIG. Using emergency authority, this support took the form of a secured two-
year line of credit with a value of up to $85 billion and a high interest rate (set at 8.5 percentage 
points above the London Interbank Offered Rate). Although the Fed denied assistance to Lehman 
Brothers on the grounds that it lacked acceptable collateral, the loan to AIG was collateralized by 
the general assets of AIG.197 In addition, the government received warrants to purchase up to 
79.9% of the equity in AIG.  
Once the determination to assist AIG had been made, assistance arguably became open-ended, 
and more government assistance was provided on several subsequent occasions. On October 8, 
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2008, the Fed announced that it would lend AIG up to an additional $37.8 billion against 
securities held by its insurance subsidiaries. These securities had been previously lent out and 
were not available as collateral at the time of the original intervention, increasing AIG’s cash flow 
problems. In October 2008, AIG also announced that it had applied to the Fed’s general 
Commercial Paper Facility and was approved to borrow up to $20.9 billion at the facility’s 
standard terms. 
The financial support for AIG was restructured in early November 2008. The restructured 
financial support included up to a $60 billion loan from the Fed, with the term lengthened to five 
years and the interest rate reduced by 5.5 percentage points; $40 billion in preferred share 
purchases through the TARP through a new program created for AIG called the “Systemically 
Significant Failing Institutions Program”; up to $52.5 billion total in asset purchases by the Fed 
through two Limited Liability Corporations (LLCs) known as Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane 
III. AIG contributed an additional $6 billion for the LLCs and will bear the first $6 billion in any 
losses on the asset values. By 2012, the Maiden Lanes had received more from asset sales than 
the Fed had contributed to their purchases. Principal and interest were recouped, and further gains 
from these LLCs were shared between the Fed and AIG. 
The 79.9% common equity position of the government in AIG remained essentially unchanged 
after the restructuring of the intervention, although assistance was increased. Additional 
restructurings were announced in March 2010 and September 2010. In the latter restructuring, the 
Federal Reserve loan was repaid in full and the preferred shares were converted into common 
equity. This increases the risk and potential reward for the government from its AIG holdings 
since the common equity can rise or fall in value based on market conditions and the future 
financial performance of AIG. Warrants initially valued at $1.2 billion were also issued to AIG’s 
private shareholders at this time, transferring value from the government to shareholders. The 
government sold its common equity stake between May 2011 and December 2012. 
With each restructuring, costs were reduced for AIG and risks were shifted away from AIG to the 
government. Policy makers initially provided loans with very high interest rates out of moral 
hazard concerns, but found that punitive conditions decreased the ongoing viability of the 
company (and, hence, the probability that the assistance would be repaid). Therefore, when 
assistance was revised, conditions typically became less punitive. Since the government held 
92.6% of the common stock in AIG at the peak, however, a case can be made that the benefits of 
any restructuring that improves AIG’s future profitability mostly accrues to the government. 
On a cash-flow basis, the Fed and Treasury combined ultimately received $23 billion more than 
they outlayed to AIG. Whether this resulted in an economic profit for the federal government or a 
subsidy to AIG depends on the opportunity cost of those funds, based on the risks that the 
government undertook and the time value of money. CBO has made such a calculation, and 
estimates that the TARP portion of the assistance to AIG will have a net cost of $15 billion over 
the lifetime of the assistance.198 At the time of the Fed’s intervention, CBO estimated a $2 billion 
subsidy for the Fed portion of the assistance; since the Fed’s intervention turned out to be cash-
flow positive and CBO has revised downward its estimates of TARP subsidies over time, that 
amount could be re-estimated downward if CBO were to update it. 
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Washington Mutual and Wachovia 
Two large banks, Washington Mutual and Wachovia, were successfully resolved by the FDIC 
through mergers during the 2008 crisis, at no cost to the taxpayers. 
Washington Mutual was a thrift holding company. Its depository subsidiary experienced depositor 
runs in 2008 following losses. It was the 81st-largest firm by revenues in 2007 on Fortune 
Magazine’s Fortune 500 list and the largest thrift holding company.199 Depositors withdrew $9.4 
billion between July 12 and July 30, and $15 billion between September 11 and 26—the closest 
the 2008 crisis saw to a traditional bank run.200 On September 25, the thrift was taken into 
receivership by the FDIC. It was resolved through a purchase and assumption agreement with J.P. 
Morgan Chase. As part of the agreement, J.P. Morgan Chase paid $1.9 billion to assume the 
claims of uninsured depositors, counterparties with qualified financial contracts, and secured 
creditors; it did not assume the claims of unsecured creditors or equity holders.201 The remainder 
of the company filed for bankruptcy on September 26. Thus, the receivership required no federal 
funds, and the moral hazard problem was mitigated since unsecured creditors and equity holders 
suffered losses. J.P. Morgan Chase’s willingness to pay to assume other liabilities implies that it 
believed the remaining assets were sufficient to honor those liabilities. 
Washington Mutual received a $1 billion, 28-day loan from the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction 
Facility on September 11, 2008. The bank was closed by the FDIC on September 25, 2008, and 
the loan was repaid after its merger. Since the loan was fully collateralized and the Fed receives 
priority ahead of other creditors, it appears to have posed little risk to the taxpayers in the face of 
receivership. Nonetheless, the loan appears to have been a departure from Fed policy since the 
Fed’s broadly based lending programs were intended to provide liquidity to solvent firms.  
Washington Mutual could be seen as an example of a TBTF bank that experienced an orderly 
resolution through the FDIC’s resolution regime at no cost to the taxpayers. Or it could be seen as 
too small to be relevant to the TBTF debate. 
Wachovia (the 46th-largest firm on Fortune Magazine’s Fortune 500 list in 2007) faced runs soon 
after Washington Mutual failed. According to Federal Reserve testimony,  
The day after the failure of WaMu, Wachovia Bank depositors accelerated the withdrawal of 
significant amounts from their accounts. In addition, wholesale funds providers withdrew 
liquidity support from Wachovia. It appeared likely that Wachovia would soon become 
unable to fund its operations.202 
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According to the Fed, problems at Wachovia were unforeseen, making the bank both a victim and 
a potential transmitter of contagion:  
At the time, Wachovia was considered “well capitalized” by regulatory standards and until 
very recently had not generally been thought to be in danger of failure, so there were fears 
that the failure of Wachovia would lead investors to doubt the financial strength of other 
organizations in similar situations, making it harder for those institutions to raise capital and 
other funding.203 
On September 27 and 28, Wells Fargo and Citigroup placed competing bids to acquire Wachovia. 
Initially, those bids were contingent on federal assistance. FDIC assistance under the systemic 
risk exception to least cost resolution had been approved.204 Later, Wells Fargo revised its offer, 
acquiring Wachovia without federal assistance and averting a receivership. 
Neither the Washington Mutual nor the Wachovia acquisitions were found to breach the Riegle-
Neal 10% nationwide deposit cap. JP Morgan Chase’s acquisition of Washington Mutual’s 
deposits and other assets occurred through an FDIC purchase and assumption arrangement. The 
10% deposit cap does not apply to an FDIC purchase and assumption. In its approval of Wells 
Fargo’s acquisition of Wachovia, the Fed noted that using the most current data, the merged entity 
would be above the 10% deposit limit. The Fed then argued that since that data were released 
with a lag, projections of current deposit data indicated that the merger would probably fall below 
the 10% cap.205 
Although the Fed’s Term Auction Facility was intended for healthy firms, Wachovia received nine 
Term Auction Facility loans between September 11, 2008, and February 26, 2009, including $5 
billion on September 25, 2008, one day before the run on Wachovia began. Its merger with Wells 
Fargo was announced on October 3, 2008. 
TARP, Citigroup, Bank of America, and the Stress Tests 
The first and largest program initiated under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was the 
Capital Purchase Program (CPP).206 The purpose of the CPP was to provide banks and bank 
holding companies (BHC) with preferred shares to increase their capital buffers against future 
losses at a time when it was difficult for banks to access private capital. The CPP was intended 
for healthy banks of all sizes and unsuitable candidates were rejected. Therefore, it does not 
closely match the definition of bailout used in this report, which implies assistance to unhealthy 
firms, or TBTF assistance. Nevertheless, CPP funds went to banks that later failed (14 mostly 
small banks, as of December 2011)207 and the first recipients were the nine largest BHCs, all of 
whom had fully repaid CPP shares by 2010. If limited to healthy banks and purchased at market 
rates, preferred shares impose limited risk on taxpayers. Despite the handful of losses on CPP 
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investments in small banks, CBO has estimated that the government will ultimately earn an 
overall economic profit (i.e., earn an above market rate of return) from the CPP from dividends 
and warrants. In October 2012, CBO estimated that profit to be $18 billion.208 
After the initial disbursement of CPP funds, Citigroup and Bank of America received additional 
TARP capital injections and asset guarantees for their balance sheet holdings through a special 
TARP program with no other recipients. The additional capital paid a higher dividend rate than 
the CPP shares. Other TARP programs included programs to assist AIG (discussed above) and the 
automakers. As will be discussed, the program for automakers was used to provide special 
assistance to two financial firms, Chrysler Financial and GMAC (later renamed Ally Financial). 
Following the additional TARP capital injections, Citigroup remained well capitalized according 
to regulatory standards.209 It appears that without TARP funds Citigroup would have fallen to 
slightly below the Fed’s minimum Tier 1 Leverage requirements of 4% at the end of 2008, 
assuming they had not raised private capital in the absence of TARP funds.210 Regulations require 
BHCs to submit a plan to the Fed in a timely manner if they fall below minimum capital 
requirements.211 In February 2009, Citigroup and the federal government reached an agreement to 
convert up to $27.5 billion of Citigroup’s TARP preferred shares into common equity. This 
agreement had the result of boosting Citigroup’s common equity ratios and ending dividend 
payments to the government.212 It also exposed the government to greater risk and potentially 
greater return on its investments, since common equity can rise and fall in value, unlike the TARP 
preferred shares. Citigroup was the largest financial firm in the country and eighth-largest firm 
overall on Fortune Magazine’s 2007 Fortune 500 list.213 
Bank of America’s financial problems centered mainly on its acquisitions of Countrywide and 
another very large financial firm, the investment bank Merrill Lynch. At the time of the Lehman 
Brothers crisis, Merrill Lynch also came under financial pressure as a result of its similar business 
model, forcing it to seek a merger partner. Merrill Lynch (the 22nd-largest firm on Fortune 
Magazine’s Fortune 500 list in 2007) was larger than either of those firms. In September 2008, 
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch reached an agreement in principle to merge. As financial 
conditions deteriorated further, Bank of America considered pulling out of the merger. To prevent 
this, according to the Treasury Secretary at the time, the government agreed to purchase another 
$20 billion of preferred shares through TARP and enter into a federal asset guarantee 
agreement.214 The merger was finalized in January 2009, and Bank of America received the 
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additional TARP shares shortly thereafter; the asset guarantee was never finalized. In its March 
2009 call report, Bank of America remained well capitalized according to regulatory standards.215 
It appears that even without TARP funds Bank of America would have remained above the Fed’s 
minimum Tier 1 leverage requirements of 4% in that quarter.216 
In May 2009, the Federal Reserve released the results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment 
Program, its “stress tests” for the 19 largest bank holding companies.217 The stress tests were 
meant to determine whether these banks would remain well capitalized in the event of a downside 
economic scenario. The tests required banks to be able to maintain Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital of 
6% and Tier 1 Common Capital of 4% in this scenario. Of the participants, 10 of 19 were found 
to be well capitalized against future losses; of those 10, the 9 participating in TARP bought back 
their preferred shares and exited the program shortly thereafter. Of the other nine that required 
additional capital to withstand hypothetical losses under the adverse scenario, seven (including 
Bank of America, which was required to raised $33.9 billion) were able to raise the needed capital 
without government funds; GMAC required TARP funds (through the Automotive Industry 
Financing Program) to raise the needed capital; and Citigroup, which was required to raise $5.5 
billion, met the threshold for Tier 1 Common Capital in part by converting more of its existing 
CPP preferred shares into common shares. After the preferred shares were converted to common 
equity, the government owned about one-third of the company.218 
In December 2009, Citigroup bought back $20 billion of TARP preferred securities outstanding, 
replacing those shares with private capital, and terminated the government’s asset guarantee for a 
fee. In March 2010, the Treasury announced plans to dispose of its common shares in Citigroup 
by the end of the year. The government ultimately sold these shares for $31.9 billion, or $6.9 
billion more than the initial assistance extended. Treasury reports that for the three programs 
assisting Citigroup combined, it had a positive cash flow of $13.4 billion.219 
In December 2009, Bank of America repurchased all of its TARP preferred shares, replacing 
those shares with private capital, and paid a fee to cancel the asset guarantee that was negotiated 
but never entered into. 
The experience with Bank of America and Citigroup is quite different from the experience with 
AIG and the GSEs. While TARP funds kept Bank of America’s and Citigroup’s capital levels 
above the minimally required level, neither firm is believed to have been close to insolvency—
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although it is unknown what would have happened to Merrill Lynch had Bank of America not 
acquired it. Bank of America repaid TARP funds in full in December 2009, and the government 
fully divested from Citigroup in 2010. CBO has estimated that the government earned an 
economic profit, calculated using a risk-adjusted discount rate, of $8 billion from its special 
assistance to the two companies.220 
GMAC 
While Congress authorized TARP to “purchase, and to make and fund commitments to purchase, 
troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by 
the Secretary, and in accordance with this Act and the policies and procedures developed and 
published by the Secretary,” TARP funding was also used to facilitate the bankruptcy process for 
GM and Chrysler.221 Economists have generally focused on financial firms as being TBTF 
because of the interconnectedness inherent in financial intermediation; determining whether 
automakers can be TBTF is beyond the scope of this report. 
In conjunction with the automakers, two financial firms related to the automakers, GMAC and 
Chrysler Financial, also received TARP assistance. Chrysler Financial was a relatively small 
financial firm, and it repaid its $1.5 billion TARP loan in full with interest by July 2009. GMAC 
received several rounds of TARP funding in order to return its capital levels to acceptable levels. 
After converting to a bank holding company during the crisis, GMAC was the 10th-largest bank 
holding company, with $180 billion in assets, in the first quarter of 2009. It dominated dealer 
floorplan financing for GM and Chrysler, and reportedly had three times the market share of its 
five largest competitors in auto financing.222  
TARP first purchased $5 billion of GMAC preferred shares in December 2008 and lent $884 
million to GM, which was later transferred to GMAC, as part of the initial assistance provided to 
the automakers. As discussed above, GMAC was one of the nine bank holding companies that 
were required to raise additional capital under the May 2009 stress tests. It was the only one of 
those nine that raised the capital through additional TARP disbursements, rather than through 
private markets. The government purchased an additional $7.5 billion of preferred shares and 
converted the $884 million loan into 35.4% of GMAC’s common equity in May 2009. The 
government then purchased $2.54 billion of trust preferred securities and an additional $1.25 
billion of preferred shares in December 2009. At the same time, it converted $3 billion in 
preferred shares for 20.9% of GMAC’s common equity. In December 2010, it converted an 
additional $5.5 billion of preferred shares into 17.5% of GMAC’s common equity; $5.9 billion of 
preferred shares remain outstanding, and the government has sold the trust preferred securities to 
private investors at face value. This made recoupment of funds for the government dependent on 
the future value of GMAC (renamed Ally Financial).223 To date, the government has sold its 
preferred shares back to GMAC and some of its common stock to private investors. Although the 
government still holds shares, the proceeds from share sales plus income received less writeoffs 
to date has slightly exceeded its total initial outlays. CBO does not estimate a separate subsidy 
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cost for the government’s assistance to GMAC, but estimates “a small net cost” for assistance to 
GMAC and Chrysler Financial combined.224 
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